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Introduction – Historiography and Biography of William Pitt, the Elder
William Pitt the Elder was one of the dominant political figures in 18th century
Britain. The climax of his career came during the Seven Years’ War, primarily between
the years of 1756 and 1761.1 It was during that period his policies produced great British
victories on four separate continents: Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America. Unlike
his predecessors and some of his own colleagues, Pitt did not fear taking risks.2 He
worked for the expansion of the British Empire and was seen as a great patriot minister.
As this thesis will show, Pitt developed and pushed an agenda focused on a
wartime victory, regardless of the financial costs. Each year more and more money was
spent on the global war that he directed. In the end, the British Empire expanded across
the globe and became the largest and most powerful empire in the world. However, when
Pitt entered office as Southern Secretary of State, the country was at a low point. Britain
relied on foreign mercenaries for her own protection, and she suffered losses in many
theaters. During his tenure in office, Pitt reversed this, and brought together the English,
Irish, Scots, and Americans to fight for the British Empire, it expanded as a result.3 More
victories were achieved and conquests made during Pitt’s time with the Newcastle
Administration from 1757 until his resignation in 1761 than during any other period of
expansion. This was one of the most successful administrations in the history of Britain,
and Pitt was its driving force.4
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Nonetheless, it was disappointed Pitt who left office as the Seven Years’ War
concluded. He departed without leaving a strategy for the British Empire he had helped
to create and with no specific ideas about how to recover financially from the global war
he oversaw. He was not a part of the government that directed the affairs of the newly
enlarged British Empire during the crucial period immediately after the war. It was
during his time away from government that decisions were made that would forever
change the dynamic between Britain and her American colonies. A little over a decade
later, the empire he worked to create would lose one of its most important components,
the American colonies. Pitt would eventually return to office. However, he was unable to
implement a successful colonial policy and thereby prevent the severing of ties between
the American colonies and the mother country.
Therefore, this thesis will contrast Pitt’s successes as a wartime leader with the
deficiencies he left for the peacetime government. It will be seen that Pitt promoted a
major shift in Britain’s military strategy during the Seven Years’ War, 1757-1763. His
decision to focus British military initiatives on the North American theatre of the war
would all but eliminate France as an imperial power in the Western Hemisphere. For that
reason Pitt has always enjoyed a special prominence in British history. Not unlike
Winston Churchill he is celebrated for the victories he oversaw. This thesis contends,
however, that this is only part of Pitt’s historical legacy. Lost in the accolades he receives
for these victories is a consideration of the costs that they brought to the British
government and empire. In peacetime Pitt was never able to reconcile the costs that this
strategy had brought with post war, political, economic, and imperial realities. The
thirteen American Colonies had been the greatest beneficiaries of his war time strategy.
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He had shied away, however, from demanding that they help meet these costs. As a
result, post war British administrations that attempted to raise new imperial revenues
from the colonies faced opposition and ultimately rebellion. Although Pitt was not in
government when the American Revolution began, we will also see that he could not
reconcile the need for shared responsibility for war debts with abstract and untested
notions of colonial autonomy. In terms of his political and historical legacy there were in
fact two William Pitts. The first was the successful war time leader who has already been
cited. The second was a peace time politician who remained prominent in the public’s
imagination owing to his previous service but who was conceptually unable to make a
meaningful contribution to mediating the growing crisis with the American colonies. To
begin this analysis we must first assess his historiographical profile.
In early histories and biographies of Pitt, he was glorified for his contributions to
England and the British Empire. His efforts during the Seven Years’ War were
documented and celebrated. He was seen as a hero, a true patriot minister who led the
British to victory across the globe and overall, these studies fall in to what one would
regard as “Great Man” profiles.5
Early biographers and historians who offered such treatment were, Walford Davis
Green, Basil Williams, and Albert von Ruville. In Green’s book, William Pitt, Earl of
Chatham, and the Growth and Division of the British Empire 1708-1778, Pitt received
credit for his vigorous measures he laid out for prosecuting the war.6 Similarly Albert von
Ruville, in William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, highlighted the new focus that Pitt gave to the
North American theatre in Britain’s long war with France. He showed that Pitt was
5
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willing to take risks in the war for the empire, and his efforts paid off.7 However, in
studies such as these, there was little criticism of Pitt, especially when it came to his
failure to develop an overall imperial policy. These biographical works also
acknowledged Pitt’s frequent illnesses and their impacts on his career. Notably, Basil
Williams, in The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, illustrated how severely
incapacitated Pitt would become when struck with illness. Williams described Pitt’s fits
of madness and insanity, arguing that he became more incoherent and unable to function
as his illnesses became more lengthy and severe.8
Recent biographers and historians have been more critical of Pitt, even finding
fault with his leadership during the Seven Years’ War. Stanley Aylings in the Elder Pitt,
Earl of Chatham, goes so far as to completely tear down the pedestal that Pitt had been
placed on more hagiographic treatments. Aylings details Pitt’s difficulties with physical
and mental illness which show Pitt to be a comparatively weak figure in the Newcastle
Ministry.9 However, more recent historians such as Jeremy Black and Marie Peters have
reached a middle ground. They still believe Pitt should be celebrated for his efforts
during the Seven Years’ War and the contributions he made to England and the Empire,
but address his short-comings as well.10 In Pitt and Popularity, Marie Peters credits him
with British success in North America she states that: “Pitt’s war leadership reaped
decisive colonial success.”11 Specifically his focusing of resources in North America
provided for constant victories. She goes on to argue that Pitt’s career had reached its
7
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height by the end of the Seven Years’ War, and that thereafter, incapacity was the
dominate theme of his life. Black and Peters remind us that Pitt was not the only one to
help lead Britain and her Prussian allies to victory during the war. They recall that Pitt
was part of a ministry to which others contributed.12 For example, without the Duke of
Newcastle, who served as Prime Minister and controlled the treasury, Pitt a Secretary of
State, would have been unlikely to achieve his mass deployment of new forces to North
America during the war. In the eyes of many of Pitt’s contemporaries, he was arrogant,
resentful, irritable, and disdainful.13 For these reasons Pitt had a difficult time making
allies and finding supporters.
Newcastle was the opposite. He had a great base of supporters, including the King
and many of his friends, and Pitt would rely on this base to get war measures through
Parliament. Earlier historians who exaggerated Pitt’s role, failed to place him in the
proper political context. As a member of parliament he required support and votes to
carry out his policies. He could not have achieved these on his own. Furthermore, he was
not a lone agent.
The government was broken down into departments and shared responsibilities
with cabinet colleagues.14 It would have been nearly impossible to control every branch
and department of the government to plan and conduct the war, and no one in Britain had
held such power since Oliver Cromwell.15 Pitt spearheaded the efforts of the war that led
Britain and the Empire to victory, but he could not have accomplished this without the
help of others.
12
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One of the more balanced treatments comes in Middleton’s work, The Bells of
Victory. Here Pitt’s role in the Newcastle administration and the Seven Years’ War is
explored within the context of ongoing debates in cabinet over strategy. Home defense
versus foreign military commitments was one such case. When Pitt entered office in
1758, the country was defended by foreign mercenaries. The army and navy had long
been neglected, and there was a long list of defeats early in the war for Britain and her
allies across the world. Reversing this situation required constant political jockeying as
will be seen.16
Pitt shifted Britain’s focus in its war against France from a secondary role in
continental European battles to a more global initiative. He was the first to see that
France could not be decisively defeated in a European war, but was vulnerable in a
global, imperial struggle.17 Therefore, Pitt shifted the policy of traditional European
campaigns to a global campaign. For the purpose of this thesis, it will be the North
American component of this strategy that receives our attention. As will be seen, Pitt’s
eventual strategy would result in the nearly complete removal of the French from North
America.
Pitt played a hands-on role in this. Throughout the war, he was constantly
analyzing letters and reports from his generals such as Jeffrey Amherst and James Wolfe,
in order to prepare future campaigns. He was eager for all the information he could gather
on both successes and failures. He spent many long hours working on plans for
campaigns, especially in America.18 This would finally bear fruit in 1759, the most
successful year of the war for the British. The successful campaigns of General Jeffrey
16
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Amherst at the fortress of Louisbourg and General James Wolfe capture of Quebec were
mainly due to Pitt’s strategic vision.19
However, Pitt failed to recognize the financial strains placed on the treasury as a
result of his global war. His desire to fight the war in America made the war one of the
most costly in British history. He ignored and failed to understand the financial aspects of
this effort and its aftermath. This theme is developed by Jeremy Black in Pitt the Elder.
He argues that Pitt lacked a comprehension of the financial realities of global war.20
Black further states that Pitt’s unwillingness to compromise made him difficult to work
with, and impeded cabinet solidarity. When advised of the growing financial strains, he
rebuffed pleas to end the war and save the economy.21 His lack of immediate concern for
finances therefore forced the statesmen who followed him to make difficult decisions that
would ultimately lead to American rebellion.
Pitt’s career tumbled after peaking with victory in the Seven Years’ War. His
career reached its height at the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War. It was the highlight
of his career, and he was admired by Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
However, he did not have the foresight to guide the Empire in its new form. He failed to
develop a plan for financing the war both during and after the war. He failed also to
develop an imperial policy to take effect at the conclusion of the war for the new British
Empire.
After the war, he was frequently sidelined by illness, and because of this, he was
largely absent politically as Britain’s American colonists became increasingly
discontented. New leaders were forced to make difficult and important decisions, often
19
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related to the growing costs of imperial defense. Decisions were made and new policies
were implemented during his absence. With his brief return to power as Prime Minister in
1766, he demonstrated how changed circumstances and physical maladies had taken their
toll. According to Black, he was now unsuitable for governing.22 In the end he was ill for
all but eight months of his premiership, and his administration was left leaderless and
without direction. During this absence, crucial decisions were made that forever impacted
the relationship between Britain and her colonies. When Pitt’s health recovered briefly,
he returned to London to resign his position, and he did not hold office ever again. This
thesis, therefore, seeks to contrast Pitt the war leader, with Pitt the weakened, peacetime
figure. As will be seen, the man who won North America, was unable to keep the
American colonies.
Pitt bitterly opposed any policy that levied new taxes on the Americans, but he
did not provide alternatives to raise needed peacetime revenues. At one point, he urged
Parliament to repeal all tax legislation enacted since 1763. He told Parliament it should
compensate the colonists for burning down their towns and destroying their lands during
the recent skirmishes between the British troops and American colonists. However, his
proposals were rejected.23 In peacetime, a combination of changed circumstances and his
own incapacities made Pitt a progressively isolated figure, according to Black.24 His
health and his age began taking a toll, and the great William Pitt was soon gone in more
ways than one.

22
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In order for the reader to see how these contrasting images of Pitt’s career will be
treated, some structural notes about the thesis must be provided. The purpose of the first
chapter is to give the reader background knowledge of the Seven Years’ War. This was
the first truly global war with conflict taking place on multiple continents. This chapter
narrates the causes of the war in the two major theaters of war: Europe and North
America. Early in the war, the prospects looked dismal for a British victory. It was not
until William Pitt came to power to conduct the war as the Southern Secretary of State
that the position of Britain finally changed. Decisive victories soon followed.
The second chapter will begin with establishment of the Newcastle-Pitt
government in 1757, as this would be the administration that would win the war. The
main focus will be to illustrate the crucial role Pitt played in Britain’s global strategy in
the Seven Years’ War. As soon as he was sworn in as the Secretary of State of the
Southern Department, he immediately began developing a new strategy that emphasized
Britain’s war efforts in North America against the French. He resisted efforts to send
reinforcements to Britain’s ally in Prussia as well as calls from within the ministry to
negotiate peace with France. However, as successful as he was in leading the war effort,
he failed to appreciate the economic ramifications of his policies. Global victories and a
global empire came at great costs to Britain and its treasury, and Pitt the wartime leader
was unprepared to address this.
As the thesis moves into the third chapter, it will shift the focus from wartime to
peacetime, focusing on the impact of the Seven Years’ War. As the war reached its
conclusion, Pitt resigned his position as Secretary of State, and he found himself in the
minority of the new king, George III’s, ministry. Unhappy with the direction of these
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changed circumstances brought, he resigned prior to the peace of 1763. Therefore, he was
not a part of the peace negotiations. Pitt was extremely unhappy with the terms of peace
and spoke out against the ratification of the Treaty of Paris almost immediately. Two
major issues needed to be addressed at the conclusion of the war. One was the financial
crisis Britain faced after the costly and lengthy conflict, and the second was the need for
new imperial understandings for the greatly enlarged British Empire. Pitt was no longer
in a position of power, nor was he physically able to be a part of this decision making
process. As a result, crucial decisions were made by other statesmen that would
eventually lead to the loss of Britain’s American colonies in 1776. Had Pitt been able to
lend the same coherence to the challenges of peace that he had shown during the war,
events might have turned out differently.
The fourth and final chapter of the thesis surveys the British crisis with her
American colonies. In 1766, Pitt formed a ministry which had the opportunity to
implement an imperial policy for the British Empire that addressed the frustrations of
Americans. Tensions were high between Britain and America as a result of the Stamp
Act, despite its eventual repeal. But before Pitt could set to work on a plan for the
Empire, he succumbed to illness yet again. The majority of his sixteen month
administration was spent in seclusion, leaving his administration without his leadership or
vision. This allowed for the rise of Charles Townshend, whose policy of imposing new
taxes continued to divide Britain and the colonies. Following his resignation in 1768, Pitt
spoke intermittently in Parliament. When he did, it was usually about the American
affairs. He was horrified by the growing rift between Britain and America but could not
offer few specific suggestions. At the time of his death in May of 1778, events had spun
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irrevocably out of control and a new war in America, this time for independence, was all
but inevitable.
Although the focus of this thesis lies in an analysis of Pitt’s wartime and
peacetime records, and the contrasts between them, a brief biographical survey must be
presented first. William Pitt was born on November 15, 1708, the second son and fifth
child of Robert and Harriet Villiers Pitt.25 His maternal grandfather was a Viscount, while
his fraternal grandfather was the governor of Madras.26 His father would eventually enter
politics. He was not from the landed gentry; but instead made his money through
investing and trade.27 This would impact Pitt’s view during his political career regarding
the British colonies in the New World. He would always remain a staunch advocate for
imperial trade.
Pitt was first enrolled at Eton at the age of eleven, where his intelligence and
abilities were recognized early.28 It was also at Eton that he experienced his first attack
of gout at the young age of sixteen.29 This was an illness that would incapacitate him
throughout his career. Periodically he would slip into severe depressions and would be
incapacitated for days or weeks at a time. The next stage of Pitt’s education was at
Trinity College, Oxford. He left after one year without a degree, following the death of
his father in May of 1727.30 Afterwards, he traveled abroad, studying at the University of
Utrecht in the Netherlands. It was there that he studied law. Meanwhile, his older brother,

25
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Thomas Pitt, became a Member of Parliament.31 Young William would eventually follow
him to Westminster.
Pitt was quite handsome in his youth. This and his affable personality aided him
in his rise to power in mid 1700s in Britain. The gift of oratory proved essential to Pitt’s
rise to power in British politics. His speeches commanded attention. He was able to
dominate his colleagues, inspire confidence in and support of his positions, and in some
cases, instill fear to gain support.32 Albert Ruvile, an early biographer, noted that: “His
attitude, his gestures, his movements and his glance united geniality with dignity, though
dignity was predominant. It was, however, the flashing eye which made the strongest
impression upon his contemporaries; its glow could excite his audience and win them to
his cause, while his devastating glance could terrify and confound.”33 These traits
propelled Pitt into the spotlight of British politics. His ability to sway opinions and gain
support was crucial in persecuting the Seven Years’ War.
Early on, his uncle, Lord Cobham, helped Pitt earn a commission in the King’s
Regiment of Horse.34 However, Pitt was not interested in serving in the military. Instead,
he wanted to enter politics. Pitt began his political life in 1735, when he was elected
Member of Parliament from Old Sarum, where he served from 1735 until 1747.35 He was
only twenty-seven years old at the time of his election; and he eventually would go on to
serve as a member of Parliament for Seaford from 1747-1754, Aldborough from 17541756, Okehampton from 1756-1757, and Bath from 1757-1766.36
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In spite of some connections, Pitt was an outsider in many ways. He was not born
into wealth or an inherited position.37 His mother was from the aristocracy, but that did
not make Pitt an aristocrat. He rose on his own. Upon the death of his grandfather, the
Pitt family was left a sizeable inheritance. It paled compared to other powerful families
of the time such as the Pelhams, Russells, and Cavendishes.38 Pitt may have not had
wealth or political connections, but his ambition, ability, and determination allowed him
to rise to power. This was quite remarkable as Britain’s class system made it difficult for
Commoners to succeed in politics. Jeremy Black has described this situation as a
“political situation dominated by aristocratic conventions.”39 Despite the politics of the
time, Pitt was still able to achieve powerful positions within the British government.
This climb began between the years of 1735 and 1754. However, it was a slow
ascent, peaking during the Seven Years’ War. As a Member of Parliament, he frequently
spoke out against Robert Walpole, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of
Exchequer.40 He also spoke out against the Hanoverian connection. In 1714, King
George I ascended the British throne from the German state of Prussia.41 George was the
distant cousin of Queen Anne, and upon her death he became king. Even though he was
King of Britain, he still was deeply connected to his native land. This connection would
impact British foreign policy throughout the majority of the eighteenth century as both
George I and his son, George II felt loyalty to Hanover and wanted it protected.42 Pitt
despised this idea, stating in Parliament: “The extreme partiality of George II for his
37
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German dominions continued to be productive of the greatest inconvenience and expense
to Great Britain. Apprehensions for the safety of Hanover had been one great causes of
the War of Austrian Succession, which terminated in 1748.”43
Pitt’s opposition to the Hanover connection made him an enemy of King George
II early in his career.44 He spoke out against involvement with European conflicts.
Instead, he wished to focus on promoting the trade and security of British territory in the
New World.45 He had already been concerned with resisting French aspirations in North
America, long before war broke out there.
Pitt married Lady Hester Grenville on November 16, 1754. He was forty-six
years old, while his new bride was thirty-six. The couple welcomed their first child in
November of 1755.46 Together they had five children: Hester, John, Harriot, William, and
James Charles. Their second son, William, became a famous politician in his own right.
He would be known as Pitt the Younger. Throughout Pitt’s career, especially during his
bouts of illness, it was his wife who supported him, even taking care of his official
communications and letters. Throughout his life, his children were a source of great
enjoyment.47 His home life was one of great satisfaction and comfort.
In 1746, Pitt was commissioned as the Paymaster General of Forces, making him
responsible for paying the army.48 King George II eventually warmed to Pitt after
previously being offended by his criticism of the King’s connection to Hanover during
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the War of Austrian Succession.49 Pitt spent nine years in the position. His time spent as
Paymaster was important for the rest of his career. While serving, he became familiar
with European territories in the New World, including those of the French.50 This
knowledge would greatly aid Pitt when he eventually guided Britain through the Seven
Years’ War.
Domestic and international crises brought Pitt to the forefront of British politics in
the mid 1700s. As conflict broke out in both Europe and the New World, Pitt was put on
the world stage. In North America, Britain failed to stop French encroachment in the
Ohio Valley as General Braddock’s troops were defeated. British troops were also
defeated in the Great Lakes region in Oswego. The British were forced to evacuate
Calcutta, in India.51 At the same time, there was a threat of a French invasion along the
English coastline. The strategic Mediterranean island of Minorca was seized from the
British.52 Britain’s failures in the early stages of the Seven Years’ War opened the door
for Pitt’s rise to power and fame.53
The losses around the globe and fear of invasion were the catalyst for change in
the King’s ministry. Pitt was ready and eager to step into his role as Southern Secretary
of State and lead Britain into one of the most successful periods of her history. In
November of 1756, he was briefly appointed Secretary of State in the Devonshire
Ministry. This appointment lasted for approximately four months as he was quickly
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dismissed, only to return to that position the following year as part of the new Newcastle
Ministry.54
The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry was one of the strongest, most powerful, and
important ministries of the century in Britain.55 It was the Pitt-Newcastle Ministry that
led Britain through the Seven Years’ War. As will be seen, it is in the context of the
Seven Years’ War, and the strategic imperative that Pitt placed upon the North American
theatre, that he truly rose to greatness.

54
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Chapter 1 – Survey of Seven Years’ War
While some in Britain may have indulged in illusions of isolation, by the mideighteenth century Great Britain was fully engaged in global geopolitics. Nativists and
imperialists might have hoped to avoid entanglements on the European continent,
focusing instead on a “blue water” policy and a growing empire, but continental conflicts
often interfered. Following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a progression of foreignborn rulers (Queen Anne exempted) expected to use British resources in support of their
continental homelands. As this generally saw Britain enter into coalitions against France,
the French response was to continue to foster the aspirations of the exiled Stuarts and
support Jacobite uprisings in the British Isles. One off-shoot of all this was European
rivalries that played out more dramatically across the Atlantic, especially where New
France, and Britain’s American colonies came into contact.
This situation became particularly acute after 1747. Once again, European
catalysts were of special significance. This was especially true regarding the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle, which ended the War of Austrian Succession. It failed to settle disputes
over trade and settlement in the New World between the two nations.1 The French held
many strategic locations in North America, especially important rivers such as the St.
Lawrence, numerous lakes, and inland waterways between the Great Lakes and the
Mississippi River.2 French control of these areas limited British settlement to land along
the Atlantic Ocean.3 At the same time, the French had been long allied with the various
Native American nations in the New World. From the beginning, the French had a more
positive relationship with Native Americans than their British counterparts. The French
1
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and Native Americans effectively confined the British Colonies to the coast. The narrow
area between the Atlantic Ocean west to the Appalachian Mountains, however, could no
longer contain and support the ever growing population of the British colonies.4
Unlike New France, the British colonies in the New World were heavily
populated. The population of the Thirteen Colonies at the turn of the eighteenth century
numbered only two hundred and fifty thousand. By 1760 it had grown to over two million
people.5 Because of this, several colonies were eager to push beyond their western
borders along the Appalachian Mountains. This aspiration was tacitly supported in
Westminster, although the ramifications of expansion were not always appreciated.6 As
the colonists looked westward, they encountered the French and their native allies.
Should conflict arise, it was unclear whether Britain’s colonies could fight for themselves
as they lacked cohesion and a common force.
The French had claimed much of the land beyond the Appalachian Mountains
based on claims by explorers such as Jacques Marquette and Robert de LaSalle. The
French also allied themselves with various Native American tribes in the Great Lakes and
Mississippi Valley by the mid-eighteenth century. The French had established a line of
forts stretching from Montreal to New Orleans.7 Both sides were quickly growing more
concerned that their rival was encroaching on their respective claims. A flash point
occurred when Virginia and Pennsylvania together formed the Ohio Land Company in
1747. The company established various trading posts in the Ohio Valley and traded with
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various Native American groups in the region. They also began surveying the land for
settlement. The French saw this as an encroachment on their claimed territory.8
The French had also been active in the regions of Ohio, the Great Lakes, and
Nova Scotia.9 In response to their perception of British encroachment on their territory,
the French sent three thousand soldiers to the Ohio Valley region. Both sides erected forts
in the disputed territory.10 The French established Fort Duquesne in present day western
Pennsylvania, and it was no small establishment. It was an impressive military fort that
sent the message the French were there to stay.11 In response, Virginia Governor Robert
Dinwiddie sent George Washington with a small militia force to the area. In the
governor’s instructions to Washington, he stated that: “The French have unjustly invaded
my land on the Ohio, and have sent flying parties of French and Indians to rob and
murder our back settlers to the west.”12 Dinwiddie instructed Washington to; “…conduct
the necessary mission to drive the French from the Ohio.”13 Specifically, Washington and
his group were there only to deliver a message to the French in the area. This message
instructed the French to halt construction of forts in the region and to resign from those
already completed, as well. The French refused the request. In response, the French
captain, Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre, firmly responded that the land was that of the
French, and that the French claim was incontestable.14 Washington and his men marched
back to Virginia to deliver the French response to Governor Dinwiddie.
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In response to the French refusal to evacuate the Ohio Valley, Washington and his
men next built Fort Necessity at the river forks of the Ohio and Monongahela Rivers. The
proximity of the Virginia milita and the French force held the potential for conflict.
Washington and members of his party soon discovered a group of French scouts in an
area known as Great Meadows. Washington believed the French were attempting a
stealth attack, and shots were fired between the French and his forces.15 These would be
the first North American shots in what was known as the Seven Years’ War in Europe
and the French and Indian War in America.
The French were outraged by the attack in what they believed to be their territory
in the Ohio Valley. Their response to Great Meadows was to attack Fort Necessity in July
of 1754. Washington was forced to surrender, losing thirty men, with another seventy
five wounded, while the French only lost three men. It was an absolute disaster for young
Washington and his milita, who were allowed to retreat to Virginia while the French
destroyed Fort Necessity.16
When Washington returned to give his report to Robert Dinwiddie, the governor
was aghast.17 The entire incident showed that the colonies would need the support of the
British in order to defend themselves from the French in an all out war to secure territory
in the disputed lands of the Ohio Valley. They needed British regulars, artillery, and the
Royal Navy if they had any chance of withstanding French attacks on the frontier. The
colonists were too inexperienced, ill- trained, ill-equipped, and small in number to face
the powerful French troops and their Native American allies.
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While the British colonial population was much larger than French population, the
French fighters and their Native American allies outnumbered the colonial militias. Pitt
had a similar opinion and fear about the British colonists against the French and their
Native American allies:
Our colonists, although wealthier and more numerous than those of France, were
infinitely inferior to the latter in point of military discipline. Almost all the French
colonists were expert soldiers. The Indians were generally attached to their
interests, and whilst our possessions were defenceless, their own were guarded by
a chain of forts.18
It also was difficult raising militia troops in the colonies. The Virginia Governor
Dinwiddie wrote to Governor James Glen of South Carolina informing him of
Washington’s defeat. He informed Governor James Glen that: “…they were taken by
surprise.”19 He tried to urge joint colonial efforts, noting: “I think we are not to be idle
and tacitly allow the Enemy to continue their unjust Encroachm’ts.”20 In the end,
Dinwiddie failed to rally support from the Virginia House of Burgesses and other
colonial legislatures.21 He lamented to the President of the Board of Trade, the Earl of
Hailfax, about the unwillingness of the colonies to join together against the French threat.
Dinwiddie noted: “…the supine and unaccountable obstinacy of the assemblies of
different colonies on this continent.”22 Fortunately for the colonies, the government in
London understood the need for a coordinated strategy.23 Domestic and foreign politics
would now impact the British response in the New World as well.
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Responding to French actions in the New World impacted politics on the
continent of Europe. Domestically, King George II, with his connection and devotion to
Hanover, was worried about a possible French attack on his homeland if conflict
continued between Britain and France in the New World.24 As tensions escalated across
the Atlantic, the political situation in Europe was changing. Between the years of 1755
and 1756, alliances were shifting and reversing.25
In January 1755, troops, supplies, and money were sent from Britain to the
colonies.26 Two regiments of the Irish Infantry went to Virginia under the leadership of
General Edward Braddock. The instructions for Braddock involved defending British
claims against French encroachments. This effort would be carried out in three phases.
The first was to remove the French from the Ohio Valley region. The second was to then
move north into the colony of New York to remove the French from Fort Fredrick at
Crown Point. Finally, the third phase would be to remove the French from newly
constructed forts near what is today, Nova Scotia, Canada.27
The Duke of Newcastle, serving as Prime Minister for the first time between 1754
and 1756, supported the plan. However, he hoped to avoid war. Braddock’s mission
would take time, and Newcastle hoped that he could still negotiate with the French.
However, shifting alliances in Europe and the efforts of the king’s son, the Duke of
Cumberland, to hasten the attack on the French prevented Newcastle from avoiding
war.28

24

Peters, Pitt and Popularity, 37.
Ibid, 48.
26
Marston, Seven Years’ War, 10.
27
Anderson, Crucible of War, 68.
28
Ibid, 68-69.
25

23

In June 1755, General Braddock attempted to seize Fort Duquesne from the
French in the Ohio Valley.29 The British had set out for the French fort on April 26.
Narrow, difficult trails; dangerous waterways; and mountainous landscapes made the
march to the French fort difficult for Braddock and his eight hundred troops.30
Furthermore, they lacked training and experience in forest military encounters.
Washington described the experience in a letter to his mother: “We were attacked by a
party of French and Indians, whose number, I am persuaded, did not exceed three
hundred men; while ours consisted of about one thousand three hundred well-armed
troops, chiefly regular soldiers, who were struck with such a panic.”31
Braddock and his troops were easily defeated by the French and their Native
American allies.32 In less than three hours of fighting, half of the British troops were
killed or wounded. General Braddock succumbed to his wounds the following day.33 The
first attempt by the British at removing the French from the Ohio country failed
miserably. Governor Dinwiddie wrote to his friend Lord Halifax expressing his
disappointment in Braddock’s defeat. He was surprised by the outcome: “I never doubted
of the Gen’l’s success.”34 This attack seemed certain to invite French counter attacks.
Significantly, Braddock’s defeat elicited one of William Pitt’s first
pronouncements on the American theater. Now in the last year of his position as
Paymaster General, he stated that war was needed: “…for the long-injured, long-
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neglected, long-forgotten people of America.”35 He believed Britain had been wasting
money and resources fighting in Europe and that attention should be focused instead on
North America. He ridiculed the failed attempt of the British in North America: “Two
miserable battalions of Irish, who scarce ever saw one another, to be sacrificed in
America.”36 This was the beginning of Pitt’s vocalization of a North American strategy;
believing the best chance of British victory involved focusing efforts there rather than
Europe. As soon as he was given the opportunity in 1757, he moved towards prioritizing
this vision. His system would to be to hold the line against France where it was strongest
in Europe while simultaneously attacking her weakest point in North America.37 In a
letter to the King, he stressed the importance of immediate action in North America
against France: “We need to act with greatest vigour in those parts throughout the
ensuing campaign, and all necessary preparations are making for sending a considerable
reinforcement of troops, together with a strong squadron of ships for that purpose, and in
order to act offensively against the French in Canada.”38 However, leaders in Britain
were not yet ready to support Pitt’s strategy.
To aid in the protection of British territory and settlers in the New World, the
government in London encouraged the colonies to join together to assist in their own
protection against the French and their Native American allies.39 Specifically, Lord
Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, sent instructions for the colonies to gather to
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promote the security of the British colonies.40 Representatives from the colonies met in
Albany from June 19 through July 11. These delegates showed little sense of urgency to
act for their common defense. The Albany Congress developed the Albany Plan of
Union. One of the main components of the Albany Plan was to: “…raise and pay
Soldiers, and build Forts for Defence of any of the Colonies, and equip Vessels of Forces
to Guard the Coasts and Protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes, or Great Rivers.”41
Representatives from the Congress brought the plan back to their respective colonies for
ratification. Not a single colonial legislature ratified the plan developed by the Albany
Congress. Pennsylvania and Virginia, which were directly impacted by warfare on the
frontier, did not approve a plan for colonial defense against the French and their Native
American allies.42 The Albany Congress failed to bring together the colonies for their
common defense.43 This short sightedness and lack of unity would continue until the
colonies came together in rising up against the mother country years later. Colonial
statesman, Benjamin Franklin, who worked diligently to develop the Albany Plan,
expressed his frustration in a letter to a representative in London: “The colonies would
not accept such a plan unless Parliament imposed one.”44 And he hoped they would as he
was concerned for the safety of the British colonies. Meanwhile, in May 1756, war was
declared.
It is now necessary to turn our attention to imperial politics and to understand the
rise of William Pitt in the context of this war. In 1754, Prime Minister Henry Pelham
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suddenly passed away. This was the opportunity that Pitt needed to finally move up into a
higher, long- desired, political position. Thomas Pelham-Hobbes, the Duke of Newcastle
and the prime minister’s brother, succeeded him. Pitt was briefly brought into the cabinet
by Newcastle. However, this administration was short- lived. Pitt’s growing opposition to
the continental war and protection of Hanover was a major reason for his dismissal.45 He
had stated in Parliament, “She [Maria Theresa, Queen of Austria] has men, and brave
men, in abundance of her own. She wants money alone to arm and support them. The
only manner, therefore, in which we ought to support her, and our other allies upon the
continent, is with our money and our ships.”46
The dismissal of Pitt and others was briefly interrupted by the Devonshire
administration as the King wished to create his own ministry on his own terms.47 In the
end, George II was forced to acquiesce and accept a Pitt-Newcastle administration. Pitt’s
popularity grew after his dismissal, and many were eager for his return to his position.48
The King was not happy, but he accepted the new ministry after his failed attempts of
creating his own during the interim period between the Devonshire and Newcastle-Pitt
ministries.
Pitt entered office as Secretary of State and War Minister in 1758. By this time,
the British had suffered many defeats in North America at the hands of the French, who
were led by General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm. The French claimed victories in present
day New York State, including important locations at Oswego, Fort William Henry, and
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Fort Ticonderoga. The British failed to re-capture Louisbourg near Nova Scotia, ensuring
continued French control of the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. Pitt complained that: “The
posture of public affairs was, in all respects, deplorable. Three quarters of the globe were
witness to the losses and calamities which Great Britain had sustained in the course of a
single year. In Europe, we had been stripped of Minorca. In America, Oswego was taken
from us. In Asia, we lost Calcutta, the principal settlement in Bengal.”49 In spite of these
setbacks, Pitt believed that the war could be won in North America.50 Under his
leadership, Britain would focus her main resources and attention towards what he
believed to be the shamefully neglected theater in North America, and away from the
European theatre. That aspect of the war, nonetheless, requires brief exploration.
The latest phase of the European conflict grew from the Treaty of Aix-laChapelle, which ended the War of Austrian Succession in 1748.51 The war originated
over the succession of Maria Theresa to the Austrian throne. Due to the
interconnectedness of the thrones of Europe and the intricate alliance system of the
continent, many nations were involved in order to protect their own interests. Britain and
the Netherlands joined Austria in fighting Prussia, France, and Spain. That treaty failed to
resolve the tensions that drove the continent to war in the first place. It would be more
appropriate to call the treaty an armistice. Both sides were exhausted by the war.52
The treaty changed very little in Europe. It essentially was a cease fire. Disputed
territories between France and Britain in Asia and North America were not addressed in
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the treaty, which would only delay conflict once again across the globe.53 For the most
part, any territory seized during the war was returned. One exception was Austria’s
valuable territory of Silesia. Prussia was allowed to retain this territory acquired during
the war. This greatly upset the Austrians. Many believed another war would break out in
time, although no one would have predicted that Europe would engage in yet another war
as a result of disputes along the Appalachian Mountains in North America.54
Britain primarily felt the impact of the conflict on the continent for two major
reasons. One was due to the King’s ancestral tie to the German state of Hanover.55 This
connection greatly impacted Britain’s domestic and foreign policies dating back to the
accession of George I in 1714.56 The second reason was Britain’s interest in the Austrian
Netherlands as it was the country’s commercial foothold on the continent.57 Therefore,
there were both dynastic and economic stakes at play on the European continent, and any
British ministry would need to balance these against priorities in other theatres such as
North America. The murky nature of European affairs often made this difficult.
Alliances were shifting in Europe.58 The traditional alliances changed in the years
leading up the Seven Years’ War particularly after January 1756, when Prussia and
Britain allied themselves in the Treaty of Westminster. Concern over the safety of
Hanover from French aggression was one of the driving forces for the new alliance. In
the end, it alarmed many nations in Europe, most notably Austria and France. Prior to
1756, Prussia’s traditional ally was France. Now Prussia had joined forces with France’s

53

Thackeray, History of the Right and Honourable William Pitt, 265.
Szabo, The Seven Years’ War in Europe 1756-1763, 3.
55
Green, William Pitt, 81.
56
Simms and Riotte, Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 11.
57
Szabo, The Seven Years’ War in Europe, 1756-1763, 12.
58
Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 34.
54

29

rival in Europe and the New World.59 Britain, on the other hand, traditionally was allied
with Austria. This greatly upset the Austrians who were still angered over their loss of
Silesia to Prussia in the previous war. In response, Austria forged an alliance with the
French. Eventually Russia would join an alliance with France and Austria.60 For the
moment, King George II was appeased because Prussia had agreed to protect Hanover
from the French. This was important as the King would reject going to war without a
promise of protection of Hanover.61
Pitt opposed the obligation to protect Hanover stating in Parliament in May of
1754, “If Hanover was made our first object, and we proceeded upon this system, it
would lead us to bankruptcy. It was impossible to defend Hanover by subsidies. An open
country could not be defended.”62 He much preferred to see Britain’s power enlarged on
the sea and in the New World rather than Europe. Despite Pitt’s objections, a new
alliance system was created as Europe and the rest of the world moved closer to war.
The three wars, including the War of Austrian Succession, typically impacted the
colonies in the New World. However, the Seven Years’ War marked a change.63
Colonial issues between the French and the British, rather than continental ones, drove
European countries to war again. The shots fired in the Ohio Valley in 1754 provided the
spark needed to light the powder keg of Europe into war.
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In Europe, Fredrick of Prussia, Britain’s new ally, began an offensive attack on
the neutral German state of Saxony.64 Fredrick took this action to avoid being
surrounded by his enemies.65 He feared he would be encircled by the Austrians in the
south, the French in the east, and the Russians in the west. Britain sent reinforcements
and supplies to their new Prussian ally. Pitt spoke out against these measures in
Parliament: “A naval war could and ought to be supported; but a continental war, upon
this system, we could not.”66 In the Mediterranean Sea, the French attacked the British
base at Minorca. After the loss of Minorca, Britain officially declared. On May 17, 1756,
Britain declared war on France.67
Britain would continue to endure losses during the early stages of the war, not just
in Europe and North America, but also in Asia where they were forced to abandon
Calcutta in India to the French.68 These losses were an opportunity for Pitt, who
frequently spoke out against the actions and failures of the government.69 He argued for
his platform of defending Britain around the world. In a debate in Parliament, he voiced
his frustration with the direction of the war and the constant initiative to protect Hanover:
“We are pressed into the service of an electorate.”70 He wanted to see a change of the
course of the war. He argued for the importance of the war in the New World rather than
Europe. Once again in Parliament he argued for: “The maintenance of our just and
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necessary war in North America.”71 He stressed the importance of only sending subsidies
to the British allies in Europe while sending British troops to fight in the North American
theatre of the war. “Our money, therefore, will be of most service to our allies, because it
will enable them to raise and support a great number of troops than we can supply them
with for the same sum.”72 Efforts would be focused in North America rather than Europe
where Pitt believed a complete victory over the French was possible. In 1756 the Duke
of Newcastle invited him into his cabinet as Secretary of State. Now, prosecution of the
war would be Pitt’s responsibility.
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Chapter 2 - Pitt’s Role in the War
The British experienced severe losses across the globe in the early stages of the
Seven Years’ War. The army suffered lost in North America at key strategic locations
including; Forts Necessity, Duquense, Oswego, and William Henry. Along with failures
at those locations, the British Army and Navy failed to re-capture Lousibourg from the
French. Louisbourg held great strategic importance, as will be discussed later in this
chapter. The British also suffered embarrassing losses in Europe, especially with the loss
of Minorca. Minorca served as an important naval base in the Mediterranean.
With the death of the Prime Minister, Henry Pelham, the King sought new
leadership to guide Britain through the on-going global war. Transition to the new
ministry was rocky at best. The King had hoped to form his own administration but was
unsuccessful. The King was now forced to accept the Pitt-Newcastle Administration with
Pitt in the position of Southern Secretary of State. It was during his tenure in this position
that Britain reversed its fortunes, won decisive victories, and in the end, a new global
empire. However, this was accomplished without regard to financial costs. As we will
see, the victories that Pitt oversaw would create a financial crisis as well.
On June 29, 1757, Pitt was officially sworn in as the Southern Secretary of State.1
In this position, he would have full command of the war, and could now focus on
interests in North America rather than on “fruitless continental campaigns.”2 That,
however, was almost hampered by the King’s fixation on Hanover.3 George II was firm
in asserting Britain’s continued protection of Hanover from foreign threats, essentially
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meaning that Britain’s involvement in the war on the continent was unavoidable.4
However, Pitt could also set priorities, and this meant that moving forward, Britain would
send the decreasing levels of assistance to her German allies.5 He wished to defend and
promote British shipping, trade, and prosperity rather than Hanoverian issues in Europe.
In order to do this, the war would need to be greatly expanded in North America. His
plans for North America called for enlarging the navy and raising more British regulars
along with more provincial troops. This initiative, coupled with subsidies to support
Britain’s ally Prussia, was all very costly.
Pitt’s focus included both naval and land-based operations.6 He had hoped Prussia
would be able to tie down French forces in Europe, and allow the British to focus their
efforts on conquering North America.7 There were also economic reasons for a North
American strategy. Pitt saw a need to defend the American colonies from French
encroachment and to protect colonial trade.8 He had always been a staunch supporter of
the economic idea of mercantilism, noting: “English interests are best served not by
active part in dynastic combinations of Europe, but by concentrated efforts in America
and India.”9
As the new ministry took hold, Pitt remarked that it was inheriting “a gloomy
scene for this distressed, disgraced country.”10 Where fighting capacity was concerned,
both the Royal Army and Royal Navy were in poor condition. The army was small and
weak. The British army was much smaller in comparison to other nations, in part,
4
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because of her long-standing domestic fears of standing armies. In her continental wars,
Britain relied mostly on foreign mercenaries from Holland, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel.11
Pitt condemned this practice and declared it an embarrassment to the country.12
As a first step toward addressing these situations, Pitt developed various measures
to better prepare for war. His first effort was the Militia Act that was passed in June of
1757.13 The act would provide training for over thirty thousand men for home defense.
No longer would foreigners be charged with this vital operation. At the same time, he
also pushed to expand both the British Army and Royal Navy for overseas actions,
including an increased budget for war supplies.14 This would only strengthen the country
and the Empire.
Pitt’s efforts were not without controversy or opposition, particularly in light of
European affairs. On the continent, the early success of Britain’s ally Prussia quickly
began to fade. Fredrick, who had led a successful offensive campaign in the early stages
of the war, failed to achieve enough quick or decisive victories. This was crucial for his
war strategy as he was surrounded by enemies in Europe. At the Battle of Kolin,
Frederick lost nearly half of his army. He was forced to withdraw from Bohemia, which
he had conquered in the early stages of the war. The French occupied various portions of
German states, including Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick. Fredrick was then forced to
fight a defensive war against the French, Austrians, and Russians, something he had
hoped to avoid when the war began. Fredrick begged his British ally for support.
However, Pitt resisted requests or pleas for troops to be sent to Europe. This put him at
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odds with some cabinet colleagues. Newcastle believed that: “… the only practical thing
to be done was to employ our whole force in a German war.”15 Time and time again, Pitt
resisted both his ally’s pleas for troops and his fellow statesmen’s entreaties on Prussia’s
behalf. Pitt championed the idea of sending money instead of soldiers to support
Prussia.16 But this alternative also meant that he could focus Britain’s focus against
France in North America.
The effort was not without controversy. The King openly called for a continental
peace so that Hanover could be protected. The Duke of Newcastle worried that: “We
shall lose the electorate this year, and God knows what next.”17 Pitt held firm in his
beliefs, however. He once again did not send troops, but he did send subsidies to Fredrick
to assist his efforts against the French. He explained that this was to aide Britain’s ally
and not simply for the protection of the Hanover. Pitt knew how important it was to
sustain Prussian efforts to allow him to focus on the French in North America. Phillip
York, Lord Hardwicke, who served in the ministry, understood that Pitt was worried that
Prussia might make peace with France. If that occurred Pitt’s strategy would fail as
France could then employ all of her forces against Britain in the New World.
King George II continued to be concerned over the safety of his homeland of
Hanover. He even authorized his son the Duke of Cumberland, to secure neutrality or
peace for Hanover with France. This attempt at peace was a complete disaster, and it
infuriated the King and forever changed the relationship between the King and his son.
Fortunately, Fredrick was then able to string two victories together at Rossbach and
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Leuthen. One November 5, 1757, Fredrick defeated the French at Rossbach. A month
later he defeated a much larger Austrian army at Leuthen on December 5, 1757.18 At the
same time, the Russians retreated in the east. These events saved the war for both Prussia
and Britain.
With the renewed efforts of Fredrick, Pitt could focus his attention on North
America. With Hanover now protected, Pitt convinced the King to support his goal of
ousting the French from North America. Before Parliament in December of 1757, the
King declared his intentions: “It is my fixed resolution to apply my utmost efforts for the
security of my kingdoms, and for the recovery and protection of the possessions and
rights of my crown and subjects in America and elsewhere; as well by the strongest
exertions of our naval force, as by all other methods.”19 Pitt, eager to forget the early
defeats around the world, seized upon the opportunity and immediately set to work on
plans for the campaigns of 1758.
His first priority was to continue maintaining troops in North America. Some had
wanted to withdraw troops for two reasons. One reason was the lack of success against
the French in North America. The second reason was that many believed the troops were
needed back in Europe. Pitt was successful in raising a larger army and keeping British
troops in place in America. Under his leadership the British Army raised over fifty
thousand troops to be assigned to the various campaigns throughout North America.
In January of 1757, orders were given to raise two battalions of Highland Scots to
be commanded by General Archibald Montgomery and Simon Fraser. Pitt believed the
hardy Scots would be of great assistance where Britain needed it the most, in North
18
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America.20 The use of Highland Scots did not come without controversy. The King and
his son, the Duke of Cumberland, at first resisted the use of Scottish troops because of the
Rebellion of 1745, which had culminated at the Battle of Culloden in 1746. The Highland
Scots were used against the French in both Canada and the Ohio Valley. By 1758, the
long needed infusion had been sent to North America to lead the charge against the
French.21 In total, there were twenty-three British battalions compared to twelve French
battalions. Over twenty-four thousand British regulars and twenty-two thousand
provincial troops were set to implement Pitt’s aggressive war strategy against the French
in North America.22
Upon the commencement of the Pitt-Newcastle Ministry in 1757, news reached
Britain that General John Campbell, the Earl of Loudoun, had called off the attack at
Louisbourg. This brought about Pitt’s reorganization of the armed forces. (Seizing
Louisbourg was a major key to Pitt’s strategy in North America; as will be discussed later
in this chapter.) One of his first actions as war minister was the removal Loudoun from
his position as Commander in Chief of the King’s Forces in America. Pitt was extremely
disappointed by the failure and lack of aggressive action by the general. In a letter from
Pitt to Loudon in December of 1757, he instructed the general to return to Britain and
informed him that he would be replaced by General James Abercrombie, his former
deputy commander.23 Pitt now informed Abercrombie that he would have over fourteen
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thousand men for the siege of Louisbourg and that the attack should start as soon as the
season allowed.24
Pitt developed a pattern when it came to his generals in North America. If they
were not achieving success, they would be replaced by those who could achieve
victories.25 Pitt paid close attention to the character of the officers he chose to place in
leadership positions. He was eager and determined to promote young and daring officers
with proven ability, believing they could best execute his ambitious designs.26 He was in
need of officers who would follow his orders and who were willing to take risks in order
to achieve victory.27 He eventually found these qualities in General Jeffrey Amherst and
Brigadier James Wolfe.
In order to expel France from Canada, Pitt’s plan rested on capturing Quebec.
Quebec was the largest and strongest settlement in all of New France. If Quebec fell to
the British, that would decide the fate of all of New France. Pitt’s plan for capturing
Quebec was to first take control of the St. Lawrence River. If the British were able to
essentially shut down the St. Lawrence to the French, that would cut off their supply
route and lines of communication for all of New France.28 In order to take control of the
St. Lawrence, British forces would need to take control of Louisbourg as it was the entry
way to all of New France. Once they controlled Louisbourg, they could proceed onto
Quebec. Once Quebec fell, the British had the ability to expel France from the whole
North American continent.
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In order for Pitt’s aggressive war strategy to work, colonial cooperation was both
desirable and sought. In a letter to the governor of Pennsylvania, Pitt promised that
troops, ships, and supplies were on their way to fight the French in the New World.29 By
1758, approximately twenty-five thousand British regulars had been sent to North
America to lead the charge against the French.30 Pitt encouraged colonial involvement
with the war. He wanted to improve the relationship between Britain and her colonies and
saw a successful war as a way of achieving this. In a letter to Abercrombie, he instructed
the new commander to: “…cultivate the best harmony and friendship possible, with the
several Governors of our colonies and provinces.”31
Pitt made policy changes in order to enlist the support of colonial assemblies and
colonists as well. Previously, colonial troops were reduced from provincial generals and
field officers to the rank of senior captains. This led to deep colonial resentment of the
British Army.32 To encourage enlistment of colonists, colonial officers were granted
equal status. No longer would they be inferior to their British counterparts. Pitt also
promised colonial assemblies would not be responsible for the financial costs of the war
effort. These promises were made in letters to governors, stating the war was at the: “…
expense the King has made for them.”33 The government in London would foot the bill
for all expenditures related to the war effort in the colonies. Pitt made these concessions
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in hopes to secure colonial support for the British war efforts in North America as he
believed cooperation was needed in order to be successful.34
American colonists did respond to these efforts.35 Requests were met, especially
in Massachusetts where the colony raised over seven thousand provincial troops. New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia also raised additional troops to support
British war efforts. However, the response was not nearly what one would expect when
overall colonial security was being threatened by a foreign power. General John Forbes
wrote to Pitt in the spring of 1758 informing him of the difficulty in recruiting colonial
forces to support the war effort in North America. According to Forbes, both the
Maryland and Virginia assemblies were slow in determining how many men would be
sent and delayed in filling the quota.36 This would be a problem that would plague the
British in North America. The colonial governments were also eager to be repaid for their
efforts in the war. This will be discussed below in greater detail.
Although it would not be without its setbacks, 1758 would demonstrate the
efficacy of Pitt’s strategy in North America as he attempted to engineer the defeat of
France in Canada. Both naval and land-based forces would be required, and it was
essential that this be undertaken in stages. Action plans were developed for a three
pronged attack on Canada. The main effort was based in the Northeast with the targets of
Louisbourg and Quebec. General Jeffrey Amherst was granted command of the landforces for the assault on Louisbourg along with Brigadiers Wolfe, Whitmore and
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Lawrence. It would be an amphibious attack.37 Once Louisbourg was taken, troops would
continue on to Quebec.
Another point of focus for the British was in the Northern colonies near Crown
Point and Lake Champlain. Here the newly appointed Commander in Chief, James
Abercrombie, was assigned to attack Canada by the way of Crown Point and to proceed
on to Montreal and Quebec. The area of Crown Point was important as it was located
between Lake Champlain and Lake George. Controlling the portage between the two
major waterways was vital for the British. By seizing these waterways, the British could
control transportation and communication in the region. The third area of attack was in
the Northwest, the Ohio-Great Lakes region. The campaigns in this region would be led
by General Forbes. According to his orders from Pitt he was to work with the “… most
efficacious towards removing and repelling the dangers that threaten the frontier of any
of the southern colonies on the continent of America.”38 Once Forbes and his men were
successful in removing the enemy in the region, they were to move northward into
Canada towards Montreal.
British capture of Canada depended on General Amherst’s success at Louisbourg.
Louisbourg was a fortress located on the island of Isle Royale (now Cape Breton Island),
which was located at the entrance to the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. It was of great value
strategically, militarily and economically. American colonists, with the assistance of the
British, had seized Louisbourg during the War of Austrian Succession, but were forced to
return the territory as a part of the terms of peace established by the Treaty of Aix-laChappelle. This had greatly upset many American colonists who believed it was
37
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important for commerce and fisheries. Now, if the British were able to seize Lousibourg,
it would cut all of New France and allow the British to control the St. Lawrence and
continue on to Quebec.
General Jeffrey Amherst was chosen over General Abercrombie by Pitt to lead the
land-forces as he had greater trust and respect for the brave, daring, young general.
Admiral Edward Boscawen was in charge of the naval forces, and was instructed to sail
to Halifax with a large fleet to intercept French supplies and possible reinforcements.39
Boscawen and his fleet, along with Amherst and over eleven thousand troops and some
provincial troops, arrived at Louisbourg on June 2, 1758. Weather and maritime
conditions made landing on the island impossible for almost a week’s time. The troops
were then divided into three groups. Brigadier Wolfe led one of the groups. He and his
men experienced the worst assault from French forces. He did not give up, however, and
inspired his men to continue despite the carnage. By the end of the day, all three groups
had settled onto the island and lay siege to Louisbourg. Admiral Boscawen and his fleet
destroyed all five of the French ships in the harbor. Without reinforcements and supplies,
French troops were forced to surrender on June 26, weeks after the siege began.40 The
loss of Louisbourg was a horrible blow to the French. No longer could reinforcements
and supplies be sent to the rest of New France. The interior of New France had been
completely cut off.
Three weeks later news of the victory reached Britain. Operations would move
onto the second stage, seizing full control of the St. Lawrence for an assault on Quebec.
However, the celebration was short lived as news of the fall of Fort Ticonderoga reached
39
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Britain. The then Commander in Chief Abercrombie led the attack on Fort Ticonderoga,
as well. Located in close proximity to Lake George, the fort was a strategic location in
what is now upstate New York. In the failed assault on the fort, Abercrombie lost over
two thousand men along with General Howe.41 This was a shocking defeat as the British
Army nearly doubled the French forces at the fort. Abercrombie’s failure would
eventually lead to his replacement by General Amherst the following year.
In spite of the positive developments in North America, Pitt’s strategy was not
wholly embraced. The Duke of Newcastle wrote to MP John White expressing his
concerns for continuing the war. He hoped to “seize the first opportunity of making a
reasonable peace.”42 During cabinet meetings, there were constant calls to end the war.
However, Pitt disregarded any push for peace. He argued against withdrawing troops,
stating in Parliament that Britain, her allies, and her colonies “would become prey” to
France and perhaps even the Spanish.43 His behavior towards other statesmen and their
differing opinions turned some away from Pitt.44 Before Parliament, he defiantly asked,
“Is there an Austrian amongst you? Let him stand forward and reveal himself.”45 He
recognized the growing expenses of the war but argued they were just and necessary
against Britain’s greatest enemy.
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While some concerned themselves with the pursuit of peace, news of additional
victories reached Britain. In August of 1758, Britain was rewarded with another victory
at Fort Frontenac located at the eastern edge of Lake Ontario. General Abercrombie
commissioned Colonel John Bradstreet of Maine to lead three thousand provincial troops
to attack the fort. The troops were successful against the French. In a letter to General
Abercrombie, Bradstreet described his victory at the French fort and the supplies seized
by Bradstreet and his troops. “… sixteen small mortars, with an immense quality of
provisions and goods, to be sent to troops gone to oppose Brigadier General Forbes.”46
These supplies would be important to General Forbes in his assault on Fort Duquesne.
The victory was also important for the British because now the French communication
between Canada and troops in the Ohio Valley was severed.
Late in the fall, the British were rewarded with a third victory in the area where
the conflict originated. Troops in the Ohio Valley defeated the French at Fort Duquesne.
Scottish General, John Forbes was in charge of the operations in the Ohio Valley. He
arrived in Philadelphia in April 1757, to seize the French fort. Forbes was forced to delay
the expedition until the end of June to wait for supplies and the needed provincial troops.
Instead of taking his forces along the route used by Braddock, he opted for a more direct
route starting in Bedford.
The new road was still just as difficult and General Forbes planned to make camp
for the winter and attack the French in the spring. Intelligence was given to the general
that French fort was poorly equipped and lightly guarded.47 The British troops began their
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approach towards the fort and the French retreated, burning the fort as they fled. Forbes
claimed victory in a letter to Pitt, “… by my having obliged the Enemy to burn and
abandon Fort Du Quesne, which they effectuated on the 25th; and of which I took
possession the next day… So give me leave to congratulate you upon this great Event, of
having totally expelled the French from this prodigious tract of Country.”48
The British renamed the fort Pittsburg in honor of the war minister, William Pitt.
In his letter Forbes stated: “I have used the freedom of giving your name to Fort Du
Quesne.”49 The news of these victories gave Pitt the political capital he required to
forestall calls for peace. Despite his concern with the growing expense of the war,
Newcastle now supported Pitt’s view. He said, “There is plenty of money in the City at
present, and a great inclination to lend it.”50 And so the war continued, and Britain would
be rewarded with a year of victories in 1759.
Pitt continued to study maps and letters from his generals in the New World. He
looked forward to 1759, and began developing plans for new campaigns and sending
letters with instructions to his generals in North America. In 1759, he moved into the
second stage of his war strategy, opening the St. Lawrence for the assault on Quebec. If
Quebec fell, then all of New France would fall. Pitt arranged for supplies and men to be
sent to the colonies for the efforts against the French.51 He ordered General Abercrombie
to prepare for the attack on Quebec by the St. Lawrence River as early as the season
permitted, but emphasized that the operations would be led by General Amherst and
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Brigadier Wolfe. Pitt intended to remove Abercrombie from his position during the
winter months, in favor of the younger general, Amherst.52
In a letter to General Amherst, Pitt stated, “The King has come to a resolution to
allot an adequate proportion of his forces in North America, amounting to 12,005 men, to
make an attack upon Quebec by the River St. Lawrence.”53 Pitt also sent letters to the
governors of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York
and New Jersey. In these letters he promised the continued “preservation and defense” of
the colonies.54 Orders were also sent to colonial governors for provisional troops to assist
the British.55 Men were supplied to support the British efforts; however, the numbers
were minimal when compared to the number of eligible men the colonists could have
raised for support.
In 1759, Britain and her Prussian ally were rewarded with a number of victories in
both Europe and North America. In Britain, people rejoiced.56 The progression began
with a victory in the West Indies, where the British successfully captured the island of
Guadalupe. Along with Guadalupe, Martinique, St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent were
taken. By now, France had lost many of its Caribbean colonies, and this brought
economic consequences. 57 The Caribbean territories seized from the French were
wealthy sugarcane producing islands, Guadalupe being the richest of them all.
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The tide of the war continued to go Britain’s way in North America, as well. By
using a three pronged approach, Pitt was able to divide the already smaller French forces.
He stressed this in a letter to General Amherst: “… as nothing can contribute so much to
the success of the operations to be undertaken in different parts of North America, and
particularly of the attempt on Quebec, as putting the forces early in motion, on the other
frontiers of Canada, and thereby distracting the enemy and obliging them to divide their
strength.”58 In 1759, the British Army did just that, attacking the French throughout
North America. In June the British took back Fort Ticonderoga. In July they captured
both Fort Niagara and Crown Point, two important strategic locations. The British now
had control of the lower lakes. Pitt wrote to General Amherst expressing his great
pleasure in hearing the news of the seizure of Niagara, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point.59
The siege and victory at Quebec proved to be slow and difficult. Pitt secured
Brigadier Wolfe to lead the assault on Quebec after his bravery during the siege of
Louisbourg. In February 1759, Wolfe set sail back to North America to prepare for the
attack on Quebec. Quebec was a natural fortress. It was located on a cliff overlooking the
St. Lawrence and St. Charles Rivers.60 Sand banks along the cliffs prevented large vessels
from coming close to shore. It was almost impregnable.61 The French had the strategic
advantage. Wolfe wrote to Pitt from British headquarters at Montmorenci along the River
St. Lawrence prior to the commencement of the siege of Quebec about the difficulties
and obstacles that stood at Quebec: “The obstacles we have met with, in the operations of
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the campaign, are much greater than we had reason to expect, or could foresee; not so
much from the number of the enemy, as from the natural strength of the country.”62
The siege of Quebec was long and hard, spanning three months. Wolfe used the
cover of nightfall to begin the attack. As day broke on September 13, 1759, Wolfe and
his troops had successfully climbed the cliffs and fighting intensified as troops met at the
Plains of Abraham. During the first day of the siege, Wolfe was wounded three times and
eventually succumbed to his injuries. Before his death, he encouraged the troops to keep
fighting as the French attempted to flee. General Thomas Townshend took over
command of the siege. Five days later Quebec surrendered. It was surrounded with no
hopes of reinforcements.63 Wolfe was hailed by the British as a hero for his efforts in
Quebec.64
Many Britons and colonists alike were excited by the victories over the French.
The London Magazine described the victories thusly: “Great Britain may now be justly
said to extend from the Southern to the Northern Pole – from the rising to the setting
sun.”65 Not surprisingly, these victories brought renewed calls for a negotiated peace,
especially in Europe. Newcastle and his supporters became quite vocal on the subject.66
The Duke of Bedford, for example, opined: “The German war, unnecessary and
unjustifiable at first is become much more so since.”67 Lord Temple told Parliament,
“Easing the nation of a load of expence, be the likeliest means under the blessing of God,
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to procure a safe and honourable peace.”68 In contrast, Pitt believed that France must be
decisively defeated everywhere. He famously described France’s precarious position: “I
have brought the country to its knees; now I shall not rest till I have her laid on her
back.”69
In spite of the aforementioned differences over the desirability of a quick peace,
Pitt and Newcastle complimented one another. From the onset of the Newcastle-Pitt
administration, clear roles were defined. Newcastle was able to control the political
machine ensuring the support and votes.70 Pitt’s dominant personality did not always
attract friends or allies while Newcastle, by contrast, had strong political support and
numerous allies.71 Newcastle also had immense influence over high ranking officials.
Newcastle had gained the favor of the king and granted access to the closet, meaning he
could meet with the King privately to discuss matters.72 The King and his friends’
support of Newcastle were vital to Pitt’s successes, as well, because they secured votes
for Pitt’s aggressive war plans, especially on the North American continent.73
Newcastle needed Pitt because he was not a strong executive. Pitt, by contrast,
was a great war time administrator. In the early stages of the war, when things seemed to
be at their bleakest, the Prime Minister continued to deliver the parliamentary votes
necessary for his War Minister’s aggressive policies, particularly in the New World.
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Then, as defeats turned into victories, Britons on both sides of the Atlantic learned that
their government’s conduct of the war could lead to profits.
The British victories around the world created economic opportunities. With
many French West Indian colonies falling under the control of the British, new benefits
arose from sectors such as the sugar trade. War proved to be a tonic for imperial trade.
Tobacco flowed into Britain from the Southern colonies, while the steady elimination of
the French from the fur trade brought new benefits to the Northern colonies. Naval stores
from the colonies such as timber, hemp, resin, turpentine, pitch and tar supplied the Royal
Navy throughout the wars of the eighteenth century, and the Seven Years’ War was no
different.74 The many wars Britain was involved in throughout the eighteenth century,
stimulated the colonial economy. Some British industries also saw profits rise as more
affluent Americans increased their purchases of British manufactured goods. Orders for
British manufactured goods from the colonies poured into Britain. On both sides of the
Atlantic, the war seemed to be popular and profitable; however, the costs were not well
understood. In time, paying for the costs of the war and the ongoing imperatives of
imperial defense would drive a wedge between Britain and her American colonies.
Expenses were rising for the British. The cost of British regiments in the colonies after
the war stood at over three hundred thousand pounds a year. While the yearly interest
alone for the money borrowed to pay for the war was over four million pounds.75 For
now, however, impending victory in North America masked future divisions.
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Year
1739
1748
1755
1762
1775

National Debt
46,954,623
78,293,313
74,571,849
146,682,844
135,943,051

Government
Revenue
5,870,000
7,199,000
6,938,000
9,459,000
11,112,000

Government
Spending
5,210,000
11,943,000
7,119,000
20,040,000
10,365,000

Source: Alvin Rabushka, Taxation in Colonial America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2008), 725

After the French surrendered Quebec to the British in late 1759, their troops
moved westward to the settlement of Montreal after a failed attempt at seizing back
Quebec. The British attacked the settlement with over eighteen thousand troops. The
troops arrived from all directions, south from Lake Ontario via the St. Lawrence, north
from Quebec also via the St. Lawrence, and south from Lake Champlain via the
Richelieu River. What remained of the French troops retreated from Montreal rather than
participating in a long, difficult siege. Thus, Montreal was surrendered and fell to the
British.
While the British were experiencing their best year in 1759, it was one of the
worst years for their Prussian ally in Europe.76 Fredrick’s brother Ferdinand had driven
the French back. However, the army was suffering from strenuous campaigns against the
French, Austrians, Russians, and even the Swedes.77 Fredrick feared for his nation. He
was eager for peace. He had hoped that the British successes around the world would
help him in peace negotiations as he continued to suffer defeats on the continent. He
hoped Prussia would benefit from British victories against the French in the New
World.78 He believed it was time to establish peace with his army in such a fatigued state.
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Pitt was not deterred, and moved for the British to attack the French at Belle Ile. He
attacked the French coast to help distract the French for Fredrick, who was nearly
completely defeated.79 In 1758, the British fleet destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of
Cartagena. By 1760, Britain had taken control of the Mediterranean Sea. They had, in
fact, destroyed the French fleet.80 This allowed the British Navy to freely roam the seas;
therefore, the empire could expand and protect its territorial possessions.81 This was a
major success of Pitt’s role as war minister.
With the French completely driven out of Canada, all that remained of France’s
North American holdings was the Louisiana Territory.82 In total, the British under Pitt’s
leadership had seized Canada, Guadalupe, Martinique, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, and
part of San Domingo. Pitt received much praise for his efforts during the war. Andrew
Mitchell, a British diplomat who served in Prussia during the war, congratulated Pitt for
his victories and recognized Pitt’s role in Britain’s success when he stated “which is your
own work.”83 Pitt set his eyes on driving the French completely out of the Western
Hemisphere. He now established plans for attacking Louisiana. However, King George
II’s death postponed further efforts. When George II died in October of 1760, Canada
and India had been won. There were victories in the West Indies and Africa, and the
French Navy had been essentially driven from the sea. This marked the height of Pitt’s
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career.84 However, with the changes to the monarchy, there were changes coming to the
ministry.
The new King lost no time expressing his desires for peace to Parliament: “I
mount the throne in the midst of an expensive, but just and necessary war. I shall
endeavor to prosecute it in a manner most likely to bring about an honourable and lasting
peace in concert with our allies.”85 The reality was that George III was not as interested
in the war as his father had been. He did not have the same connection to Hanover, and
unlike his predecessor, he had been raised in England and was seen as a true Briton.86
Therefore, he did not share their prioritization of the security and protection of Hanover.
He was also much more interested in increasing his powers as King. This had important
political ramifications. Dating back to George I’s accession in 1714, the Hanoverian
dynasty had been dependent on the support of the Whig Party in Parliament, and a
progression of ministries dominated by Whigs.87 George III now wanted to chart a more
independent political course. However, until the war was won, he continued to depend
upon the ministry he had inherited, including his Secretary of State and War Minister,
William Pitt.
There had been attempts at peace, as early as 1759 after Britain’s string of
victories. However, Pitt was able to continue the war effort, as he went on ahead with
plans while preliminary negotiations began between Britain and France. More formal
negotiations took place in 1761. Britain was in a good position for bargaining. However,
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Fredrick had been struggling in Europe. This would impact the negotiations. Britain
would perhaps be forced to make some concessions in order to help Prussia.88 However,
France suffered greatly in North America and was anxious to end the devastating war.
Pitt’s character and personality were not compatible with making peace. All of his life he
was a man of the opposition. Negotiations and compromise were not strong suits of Pitt.89
He would only support peace as long as all the territory conquered would be retained by
Britain.90
The Duke of Newcastle felt exactly the opposite, believing peace was absolutely
necessary for Britain no matter what the circumstances were. He believed the country
could not sustain the expensive war effort any longer.91 Eventually peace negotiations
were left to the King’s new minister, the Earl of Bute. The Earl had a long standing
relationship with the King’s mother, the Princess Dowager, who kept her son sheltered
growing up. Bute was given the position as Groom of the Stool and had complete control
over the prince’s household, including his upbringing and education.92 Bute was illprepared for the role he would take in the early stages of King George III’s rein.
However, when it came to peace, he agreed with Newcastle. He was just as eager for
peace and would be willing to make concessions if it ended the long and costly war.
In August 1761, the Family Compact was signed, uniting the Bourbon crowns of
Spain and France. In the alliance, Spain pledged its support for the French if peace was
not attained by May 1762.93 This alliance upset Pitt tremendously. As he stated in a letter
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to Bussy, a British ambassador, “Peace so much desired is far distant.”94 Pitt even argued
for a preventative war against Spain in hopes of completely destroying the Bourbon
dynasty once and for all.95 Part of his reasoning was that the British had been successful
in removing the French threat in the New World, but the Spanish one still remained.96 He
also saw opportunities for imperial aggrandizement if Spanish holdings, such as Cuba
and the Philippines, could be acquired.
Lord Bute was first to oppose action against the Spanish complaining that Mr.
Pitt’s plans were rash and unadvisable. The Duke of Bedford agreed with Bute and spoke
out again against the continuation of the war. He contradicted Pitt’s aggressive stance:
“A continental war was never proper for England… now we are at war without allies.”97
Pitt’s ally, the Duke of Newcastle, abstained from the discussion in the cabinet meeting;
however, in private communications he expressed his concern with declaring war against
Spain.98 He worried about the increased financial burdens of expanding the scope of the
already lengthy and costly war.99 In cabinet meetings Pitt continued to press the
immediate need for war against Spain, arguing that Spain’s actions were menacing to the
British. It seemed that Pitt was alone in this viewpoint. Even after further deliberations in
cabinet meetings, members still disagreed with Pitt and his stance on declaring war on
Spain. Mansfield worried how the neutral nations of Europe would react to a war
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between Britain and Spain. Admiral Anson, who was involved with the capture of
Louisbourg, worried that the British fleet was not ready for war against the Spanish.100
The King himself was ready for peace rather than increasing the scope of the war.
The King in a written response to the House of Commons stated his happiness with the
pursuit of peace: “The assurance of your steady and vigorous support must add the
greatest weight to my endeavors for the public good, and will be the surest means of
bringing the war, in which we are engaged, to such a conclusion, as is the constant object
of my wishes, and will most effectually provide for the honour, happiness and security of
my kingdom.”101 Pitt was alone in his stance.
Divisions within the government over continuing or ending the war isolated
Pitt.102 In October 1761, he officially resigned as Secretary. However, his removal from
the cabinet was inevitable as the king was eager to create his own ministry. In a letter
from Pitt to the Town-Clerk of the City of London, he explained his two main reasons for
resigning his post. Pitt explained he had “a difference in opinion with regard to measures
to be taken against Spain.”103 He resigned, most importantly, he said: “in order not to
remain responsible for measures which I was no longer allowed to guide.”104 Pitt’s
resignation gave more power to the King’s confidant, the Earl of Bute.
In the end, the British achieved victory over the French. As Pitt had predicted, the
Spanish did enter the war. However, the British were able to defeat them. The King had
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hoped to avoid war with Spain, in order to secure peace, but he eventually realized the
futility of his opposition to a war with Spain: “I have found myself indispensably obliged
to declare war against Spain.”105 During the war, it was Pitt’s dominant and energetic
personality and Newcastle’s political strength which made them a strong force in Britain.
Britain’s alliance with Fredrick had forced the French to fight on two fronts, one in
Europe and another in the New World.106 Keeping the French tied up in Europe had
allowed for British victories in the New World. At the same time, Pitt’s alliance with
Spain kept the Spanish neutral in the war, both in Europe and the New World, at least for
the majority of the war until the Family Compact was signed.107
Pitt remained steadfast in his beliefs throughout the war, even when he was tested.
Throughout the war, he felt pressure to recall soldiers to protect the home front and aid
Britain’s ally Fredrick in Europe. Many leaders in Britain worried about a possible
French invasion along the English coast throughout the war and wanted to recall troops to
protect the shorelines. However, Pitt was adamant, and never during his entire tenure did
he recall a single man from service.108 He refused at times to send reinforcements to
Fredrick, causing considerable strain in the alliance. When he did send reinforcements,
he sent as few as he possible so he could continue his focus on campaigns in the New
World.109 While he was appeasing his ally on the continent, he remained true to his
promise to the colonies to provide support against the French.

105

The King’s Speech Concerning a War with Spain, January 19, 1762, printed in William Cobbett, ed. The
Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman Conquest, in 1066 to the Year of 1803: Volume 15,
1125.
106
Williams, The Life of William Pitt, 32.
107
Middleton, Bells of Victory, 217.
108
Green, William Pitt, 148.
109
Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 180-181.

58

This focus on North America was extremely expensive. The massive efforts in
North America drained the treasury. The high costs of transporting men and supplies to
North America and even travel on the continent itself added to the rising costs. His efforts
in the global war made it one of the mostly costly wars in British history. Funding was
needed to repay the debt accumulated from the war. As peace was established, leaders in
Britain focused their efforts on the greatly depleted treasury. However, Pitt was not a part
of this recovery effort.

Table 4.2: Cost of major British wars, 1689-1783 (in millions of British pounds, £)
Grand Alliance (1688-1697)

49

Spanish Succession (1702-1713)

94

Austrian Succession (1739-1748)

96

Seven Years’ War (1756-1763)

161

American War (1776-1783)

236

Source: Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll, Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics
Explain Military History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 140. 110

It is evident that Pitt’s leadership throughout the war made gave Britain the
strongest and largest empire in the world. When he entered office, he inherited a dismal
state of affairs. Britain had suffered losses across the globe and was forced to rely on
foreign mercenaries for its own protection. However, when Pitt took the reins, he
developed a successful war strategy and led the British to victories across the globe.111
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However, he did not have the foresight to plan for the future relationship between
Britain’s colonies and the mother country. The aftermath and effects of Pitt’s Seven
Years’ War would contribute to the eventual breach in the relationship between the
colonies and Britain in the 1770s. The expense of his aggressive campaigns, especially in
North America, strained the treasury. Politicians and citizens alike worried about the
financial situation. London would now look to the colonies to raise revenue and to help
repay the debts incurred during the Seven Years’ War. The British Empire and Pitt’s
career simultaneously reached their zenith. However, these successes had come at a great
cost and now the bills were coming due. Ironically, the man who had done so much to
win the war would be absent from efforts to secure the peace. As will be seen, his
leadership would be missed.
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Chapter 3 – Impact of the Seven Years’ War/French & Indian War
As a result of the Treaty of Paris, the British Empire was enlarged, expanding
across multiple continents. However, the great global victories came with a cost. This
chapter analyzes the financial repercussions of Pitt’s efforts during the Seven Years’
War. Throughout, Pitt was unconcerned with the financial implications of his policies. He
resigned from office just prior to the Treaty of Paris, and therefore he was absent during
the crucial period immediately after peace. A new imperial policy was needed for the
greatly enlarged Empire, but Pitt had not envisioned a plan for addressing these new
realities. As we shall see, new leaders began to orchestrate very different policies that
forever impacted the relationship between Britain and her colonies.
The terms of the Treaty of Paris were signed on February 10, 1763. Many
territories exchanged hands as a part of the agreement. France agreed to return Minorca
in the Mediterranean Sea to the British. It also ceded all of Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape
Breton, Grenada, and Senegal to Britain. In Europe, France would evacuate its positions
in the German states of Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick, and Prussia. In return for all of this,
Britain promised to return Guadalupe, Belle Island, Desiderade, Mariegalante,
Martinique, St Lucia, and Goree to France.1 The French were allowed to maintain control
of New Orleans, while the Spanish took control of the Louisiana Territory, a large area
stretching from the Mississippi River west to the Rocky Mountains. In exchange for
control of Louisiana, the Spanish ceded Florida to the British. The treaty secured for
Britain a large empire stretching across the globe, and many celebrated the conclusion of
the war. Pitt was at the center of that celebration. A London bridge was named in his
1
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honor.2 Fort Duquesne in the Ohio Valley was renamed Fort Pitt and eventually became
known as Pittsburgh. He received praise on both sides of the ocean. In the Lords’
Address on the Preliminary Articles of Peace, the majority spoke of “the satisfaction
which we have received at the foundation laid by the Articles for a Treaty of Paris.”3 The
political nation also indicates its desire to see the war end. However, one man in
particular would drastically disagree with the terms of peace.
Pitt was extremely upset by the Treaty of Paris. He viewed the treaty as too
lenient toward the French, and he was bitterly disappointed that so much territory had
been returned to them, especially after the British had seized essentially all of New
France. The terms of peace went against his hope and goal of utterly destroying the
French both on land and at sea. Pitt never again wanted to see the French as a threat to the
Empire and its prosperity, and he advocated the destruction of the Bourbon monarchy,
even if that meant fighting another war against Spain. However, Pitt was no longer in a
position of power and was forced to accept the terms of the peace treaty. He had resigned
from office prior to the conclusion of the war and the ensuing peace negotiations in Paris.
However, he returned to Parliament when the peace treaty was debated.
Henry Fox, a member of the Whig Party and previous Secretary of War and
Paymaster General, spoke in favor of the treaty: “That we are convinced that posterity,
from their own experience, will hereafter agree with us, in esteeming that peace to be no
less honourable than profitable, by which there will be ceded to Great Britain such an
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addition of territory, attended with so great an extension of our commerce.”4 Many
members of Parliament agreed with this statement on the peace treaty.
Pitt was not numbered in that company. In spite of suffering from another attack
of gout, he dragged himself to Parliament on December 9, 1762, where he spoke while
leaning on a crutch, for over three hours against the treaty.5 He feared that “the seeds of a
future of war” were sown in the peace treaty. He stated in his speech that “peace was
insecure, because it restored the enemy to her former greatness… The peace was
inadequate because the places gained were no equivalent for the places surrendered.”6 In
the end peace was approved by the House of Lords in a vote of three hundred nineteen to
sixty five, and two hundred twenty seven to sixty three in the House of Commons.7
Pitt had failed to sway members of Parliament. Most legislators and citizens were
ready for peace. The original purpose of the war was to secure the colonies on the North
American continent and increase trade within the empire. Those two goals had been
achieved so Parliament voted to accept the terms of peace. It would have been impossible
to retain all of the territories seized around the globe. However, Pitt was angered by the
fact that Britain was returning territories to the French. It was apparent that most did not
agree with him and perhaps both his influence and his health were declining. The great
patriot and statesmen from the Seven Years’ War was diminished in stature and in
influence.
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After the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, Pitt’s deteriorating health became
more apparent. Physically he suffered gout related pain, while at the same time his mental
health began to decline. Following his speech against the approval of the Treaty of Paris
on December 9, 1762, he would be absent from Parliament until March of 1763.8 At
home, he demonstrated increasingly erratic behavior, and his friends feared that his
political career had reached its end. Meanwhile, the empire he had fought to protect and
expand began to fracture, especially in America.
Victory had been expensive for Great Britain. At the beginning of the war, the
national debt had been seventy-two million pounds. However, the costs continued to rise
each year of the war. In 1757, the cost was eight million five hundred and nine thousand
pounds. It increased to over ten million in 1759, to thirteen million in 1760, to almost
fifteen million in 1761. Towards the end of the war, the debt soared to over one hundred
and fifty million pounds.9 The debt had been doubled by the costs of the war.
Pitt had consistently pressed for the war to continue beyond its original goals, and
this made extraordinary demands on the British treasury. The loans for the war were at a
high interest rate, which only served to drive up the cost.10 Pitt did not focus on any of
this. His focus was on military preparations rather than financial ramifications, but these
would now impact Britain and its empire. As the following Table illustrates the logistics
of the wars Britain was involved in throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth
century. It highlights expenditures throughout the wars, the annual revenue the
government accrued from taxes, as well as the debt at the beginning and conclusion of
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each of the wars. The table shows the astounding debt at the end of the Seven Years’
War.
Throughout the Seven Years’ War, the nation willingly gave men and money to
support the cause against the French in Europe, Asia, and North America. British
taxpayers were told that the conflict was a struggle to protect their overseas settlements
and trade.11 Pitt played to this and was influential in securing money from Parliament for
the war effort.12 He believed everything he championed was worth it for the greater good
of the British Empire, and he constantly asked for more troops and supplies. 13 Pitt was
aware of the growing costs of the war, however, at the time, he did not want to worry
about these costs. In this, he ignored pleas to establish peace from his follow statesmen
such as the Duke of Newcastle.14
In addition to being prime minister, Newcastle ran the treasury and was
responsible for securing loans to fund the war. He complained constantly over the rising
expenses.15 However, Pitt ignored Newcastle’s concerns. He stated in Parliament that it
was “wrong and unjust to represent Great Britain in so deplorable a state, as unable to
carry on the war.” He continued, explaining that “England never was better able to
support a war than the present.”16
Many historians believe it is right to criticize Pitt here for his naïve understanding
of finances and his belief that Britain had endless credit for financing the war.17 How
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could one not be concerned about the increasing costs of the war? At the time he had the
support of the citizens and most government leaders for the war. The war was Pitt’s main
focus and concern was to see France completely and utterly defeated.
With the end of the war, however, the proverbial piper would have to be paid.
Furthermore, the changed realities of peace-time efforts to cover wartime debts would be
undertaken by a new ministry serving under a new king. After a brief ministry, partly due
to his lack of political experience, Lord Bute resigned.18 George Grenville, Pitt’s brotherin-law, then became Prime Minister. Grenville, like Pitt, had been educated at Eton and
Oxford. He also began his political career in the House of Commons. In 1741, he was
elected to Parliament from the borough of Buckingham, a position he held for the rest of
his life. Early in his career he allied himself with Pitt in the opposition, speaking out
against Walpole and King George II’s affiliation with Hanover.19 While serving as a MP,
he was recognized for his efforts and rewarded with a number of positions within the
government, mainly treasury positions. It was during his time in the Pelham and
Newcastle administrations that he became familiar with the finances of Britain and the
Empire. His alliance with Pitt would be broken as Grenville allied himself with Bute
upon the accession of George III. He served as the Secretary of State of the Northern
Department in Bute’s administration.20 Upon Bute’s resignation, Grenville became prime
minister.
Grenville and the leaders who followed him would be responsible for acts such as
the Sugar, Quartering, Currency, and Stamp Acts. The Board of Trade’s position, which
had reigned supreme over colonial policy, fell out of favor. Other executive departments,
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the Secretary of State, ministers, and Parliament would become more involved. This was
also a turning point in the administration of the colonies.
The economic constraints incurred by the British Empire after the Seven Years
War led to difficult decisions that had to be made by Parliament. The growing debt
problem stemming from Pitt’s aggressive war strategy could not be ignored and needed
to be addressed immediately. Britain somehow needed to make up for the debt accrued
fighting the war and then acquire financing for a larger empire in the New World.
Leaders at Westminster recognized that new revenues were needed immediately in order
to alleviate the strain on the treasury.
In general, the cost of the American colonies was ever increasing. Contrary to
popular belief in history classrooms across the United States, the issue of money spent to
protect the colonies was nothing new in the period after the Seven Years’ War. This had
been an issue in Parliament prior to the war in the early to mid 1700s. Prior to the Seven
Years’ War, administration of the colonies cost approximately seventy thousand British
pounds annually. However, this issue came to the forefront after the war, particularly
during the Grenville Administration.21 The cost of civil and military establishments was
increasing to over three hundred and fifty thousand British pounds and continually
growing. This amount was five times larger than fifteen years prior for the civil and
military establishments in the colonies. These expenses were in addition to the debt
incurred financing the actual war effort itself. The financial issue was the most difficult
problem that developed after the long war with France.
The financial situation after the war led British leaders in Parliament to enact
legislation to repay the enormous war debt. There were three main sources of revenue in
21
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Britain. They were the land tax, the malt tax, and the tonnage and poundage tax on
imports and exports. Together these taxes brought in between seven and eight million
pounds a year, not nearly enough to cover the rising cost of the war.22 Parliament
recognized that British taxpayers had been heavily burdened during the war, and did not
want to put additional financial strain on the landowning class.23 Increasing taxes on the
British taxpayers would be too burdensome; they had already borne most of the burden of
the debt and taxes.24 Citizens living in Britain were paying approximately eighteen
pounds in taxes, while colonists in the New World were only paying approximately
eighteen shillings in taxes.25 The colonists essentially were paying one-fiftieth of the
taxes British citizens were at the time.26 The debt from the war and the costs of running
and maintaining a large empire three thousand miles across the Atlantic Ocean forced
new leaders in Britain to make difficult decisions, especially as the debt accumulated and
reached over one hundred and thirty million British pounds.27
The colonies were prospering, and their wealth was growing. Politicians and
citizens alike looked to the colonists as a reasonable source of revenue to help offset the
enormous costs of the war. It seemed reasonable that the colonists should help contribute
to the finances of the Empire. After all it was partly for their own defense and well-being.
Not only was the government interested in eliminating the war debt, but it also wanted to
secure money for the costs of the administration, maintenance, and protection of the
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Empire.28 Many in Britain believed the colonists could afford these new costs.
Merchants and manufactures had long recognized the growing wealth of the colonies.
Colonists were even importing luxury goods from Britain, giving the image of prosperity
and wealth in the colonies.29 No longer were they just importing and purchasing basic
supplies for survival.
Parliament was aware of the growing wealth of its American Colonies. The
colonists had not been asked to contribute previously despite the prosperity they were
experiencing. Leaders in Britain made changes to its traditional colonial policy as a new
imperial policy was needed for the changed empire. The new acts were to collect revenue
from the colonies for their maintenance and protection. This was a major change in
British colonial policy. These acts imposed direct taxes onto the colonies, a drastic
change from the policy that had dominated the British colonial policy since the late
sixteen hundreds.30 Pitt was absent as major changes were made to the colonial policy
between Britain and her colonies.
Prime Minister Grenville, and eventually, Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles
Townshend wanted to put as little of the burden as possible on the landowning class at
home. At the same time they wanted to avoid an internal or direct tax on the colonists.31
Ministers who came to power after 1763 found themselves in a very difficult situation
following the Peace of Paris.
Grenville, Townshend, and others, were well aware of the fact that imperial trade
had created enormous benefits and growth on both sides of the Atlantic. Now the difficult
28
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task was how to harness the imperial trade to maximize it for peace-time benefit.
Grenville had no intention of threatening the liberty of American colonists. His agenda
was to solve the financial problems of the Empire. He wanted to avoid increasing the
landed gentry’s taxes as they had born the brunt of the costs for the protection of the
colonies. The two were tied together by prosperity of their commercial relationship.
Colonial trade was growing steadily throughout the eighteenth century. The British
recognized the importance of this profitable mercantile relationship. In 1700, colonial
trade was worth approximately five hundred pounds; by 1770, it was worth over two
million eight hundred pounds. As the Revolution approached colonial trade was more
prosperous than it had ever been.32 According to Governor Thomas Pownall, the Atlantic
commercial empire was of immense importance for both wealth and power for the British
Empire.33 Once the Grenville Administration established itself, the British initiated
reforms in the relationship between Britain and her colonies, thus the imperial crisis
began which ultimately led to the American colonists declaring independence from Great
Britain.
In addition to the defense of the colonies, enumeration and the bounties offered by
the current colonial system also contributed to the British debt.34 The colonies had
benefited from the mercantile system established by the various Navigation Acts. The
intentions of the various acts of trade were to regulate commerce and bring in further
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revenue for the Empire.35 As a part of the Navigation Acts a list of enumerated goods was
established. Goods such as sugar, tobacco, indigo, and cotton were to be sent to Britain
first and then exported. This assured markets for goods for both Britain and the colonies.
They both also benefited from the bounties, sums paid to colonial producers for certain
goods, established by the Navigation Acts.36 Bounties were offered on such goods as
lumber and indigo.37 In total between the years 1706 and 1776, London paid colonial
producers over one million four hundred pounds, roughly over one hundred and seventy
million dollars today.38 Shipping and trading increased as a result of the Navigation Acts.
They did not harm and inhibit colonial trade or the colonial economy.39 It actually
encouraged the development of the British colonies.
Protection of the colonies in North America and on the high seas and endless
bounties offered to the colonies were nonetheless expenses financed by the British
treasury. It was the economic system that was imposed by the various acts of trade and
protection of the British Army and Navy that allowed for the success and prosperity of
the American colonies.
There was now more than ever the need for the colonies to contribute to imperial
defense. However, the cooperation of the colonies during the war was less than ideal. In
order to assure colonial cooperation, Pitt promised colonial leaders of unwavering British
support for their defense against the French. Directing the war, Pitt only asked for a small
number of men compared to the number of British redcoats sent to the New World.
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General Forbes wrote to Pitt about difficulties gaining support from the colonies towards
their own protection. One instance, Forbes stated, “I shall be well pleased if I get more
than half of their number.”40
Pitt communicated frequently with colonial leaders. In order to secure support, he
had to stress the crown’s commitment to reimburse the colonies for their contributions. In
a letter to Pitt, Governor Thomas Pownall of the Massachusetts Bay colony expressed his
concern over the costs of the war. He informed Pitt of his concern: “for proper
compensation for these services according to the active vigour and strenuous efforts we
have made.”41
The colonial leaders failed to recognize the plight of the British treasury for a war
fought for the protection and benefit of their citizens. All the while, the British treasury
was spending an enormous amount of money, and the colonies were simply concerned
with their own economic situation. However, Pitt reassured in letters to the various
colonial governors their loyalty to protecting the colonies and repaying them for the costs
their colonies incurred as a result of the war. It was at the “expense of the King.”42
Repaying colonial governments added to the rising debt of the British treasury.
As a result, Britain did deserve some financial contributions from the colonies as
the colonies contributed few men and financial aid to the war effort that greatly benefited
them. The British had fought a war for their defense and continued to have a military
presence after the war in the New World for their continued protection. However, the
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British were left with a challenge regarding how to preserve the Empire and the
constitution as well as deal with the financial strains on the treasury.43 This problem
would plague leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean in the decade that followed the
Seven Years’ War.
Leaders at Westminster, for two main reasons, believed the time had come for the
colonists to contribute towards the imperial Empire. First, the colonies were the major
beneficiaries of the imperial trade policies. The colonies’ wealth continually grew due to
the connection with Britain and the commercial system that was established and modified
throughout their history. The colonists enjoyed a higher standard of living than residents
of the British Isles. The per capita annual income was one of the greatest in the world.
The annual growth in income per capita in the colonies was approximately .3% to .6%.
This was a significant yearly increase.44
The second reason why leaders at Westminster believed the colonists should
contribute was the colonists benefited immensely from the British global victory in the
Seven Years’ War. The colonies no longer had to fear French threat anywhere in North
America. Now the colonies were poised to expand westward. For example, the new
lands west of the Appalachians in the Ohio Valley that were acquired by the peace in
Paris would directly benefit the colonists.45 However, on the other side of the ocean, the
colonies’ mother country was struggling from the effects of the war. Grenville truly
understood the financial troubles of the Empire.
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In the King’s speech on the opening of the Parliamentary session he pressed
Parliament to take action on the financial situation of the Empire: “The heavy debts
contracted in the course of the late war, for many of which no provision is yet made, call
for your utmost attention, and the strictest frugality.”46 The House of Commons
addressed the King’s message stating they would: “diligently weigh every regulation
which may be proposed for the improvement of public revenue, as the most effectual
method to reduce the national debt, to relieve your Majesty’s subjects from the burthens
of the late war, and to confirm and strengthen public credit.”47 Members of Parliament
worked to address the main concern of many in the Empire, the large debt from the war.
Prime Minister Grenville developed a comprehensive plan for dealing with the
financial issues and presented it to Parliament. He looked to create an indirect tax that
was both legal and more enforceable, unlike previous acts of trade. He believed it was
time to readjust the imperial policy towards the American colonies.48 The previous
colonial system had outgrown its effectiveness as the colonies had grown far beyond their
early establishment a century ago in terms of their size, population, wealth, and even
strength.49 The new plan was well-received by both the members of Parliament and the
British people.50 Previous economic measures such as the Navigation Acts and Molasses
Acts did not provide enough money to pay for debts incurred by the expensive war.
However, there were some that were concerned about changing imperial policy. Pitt was
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one of them. In contrast to his ability to gather support for the war, he was unable to stop
or rally support against Grenville’s policy until it was too late.
At the same time, the British did not know how the Native Americans and French
colonists living within the British Empire would react to their new situation. Would there
be attacks from the remaining French and Native Americans on the British colonists?
That was a serious issue that Parliament needed to address. For that reason, many
believed there was a need for a British military presence in the colonies to protect the
colonists.51 However, this military presence in the New World would once again be
another expense the British faced, especially as the increased amount of land control by
Britain led to more territory to be protected. This contributed to the difficult position of
the British in the post Seven Years’ War era.
Parliament first passed the Sugar Act of 1764. It hoped to collect forty-five
thousand pounds each year.52 Leaders in Britain proposed the Stamp Act to alleviate the
growing financial problem. Leaders estimated that the Stamp Act would bring in sixty
thousand pounds of revenue. This was by no means an excessive amount of money;
however, Britain needed to do something about its debt from the war and to offset the
growing costs of the administration of the colonies that amounted to over one million
pounds. Colonists had constantly reiterated the fact that they were equal to their
counterparts back in Britain. James Otis, a colonist, stated, “…the colonists… born here
are freeborn British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights… from the
British constitution… design to secure the liberties of all the subjects to all
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generations.”53 He believed colonists’ basic rights were deprived. The argument could
be made then that they should pay a similar amount as their British brethren if they were
truly equal. The colonists were enjoying the benefits of the British Empire; it seemed
only fair they contribute to the growing cost of the Empire.
Grenville moved forward with his plans for raising revenue from the colonies.
They had already been reimbursed for their expenses from the war as promised by Pitt
during the war. Grenville refused to increase taxes on Englishmen, who had long been
burdened with high taxes. He had hoped and preferred that colonial legislatures would
develop a tax to help support the Empire, but they did not. Therefore, Grenville moved
forward with his Stamp Act tax. Grenville assumed that the colonists would accept this
new act enacted by Parliament.54 Many in Parliament agreed with Grenville and passed
the Stamp Act. In February of 1765, it passed the House of Lords with virtually no
debate, and easily passed two hundred forty five to forty nine in the House of
Commons.55 However, this is not to say that there were not people who had reservations
about the act or who disproved of the taxation of the American colonists.
The Stamp Act was the first major imperial taxation legislation involving the
colonies.56 As stated in the legislation, its purpose was: “defraying the expenses of
defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and plantations in America.”57
This act required that all legal and commercial documents such as merchant papers have
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an affixed seal or stamp on them. Also included in the requirements of the Stamp Act
were legal documents, newspapers, pamphlets, and even playing cards. British citizens
had long been subjected to a Stamp tax of their own. The revenue that would be raised
would be directly used for paying down the debt from the Seven Years’ War, as well as
for providing future defense.58 The Stamp Act fees were minimal, a light tax to attempt
to recoup some of the costs from the war. 59 This was made quite clear to the colonists.
This was not intended to be any sort of permanent burden. There even was a year’s grace
period prior to the collection of the tax. The tax applied to all British colonies, not just the
American colonies. Parliamentary proceedings on the Stamp Act explain the goal of this
action: “An act for granting and applying certain stamp duties, and other duties, in the
British colonies and plantations in America, towards further defraying the expenses of
defending, protecting, and securing, the same.”60 Grenville’s Act was nonetheless a
change from the previous mercantile policy. This was a more encompassing imperial
policy.
Grenville made an honest attempt to make the British Empire financially sound.61
He did not wish to antagonize the American colonists with his plan for recouping the
costs from the war. Leaders in Britain thought it was only reasonable to request that the
American colonists contribute to the Empire. The majority of the war efforts Pitt had
engineered were focused in North America, and he had resisted many attempts for peace
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and recalling troops from North America back to the front in Europe. It was the colonists
who directly benefited from the efforts of Pitt and the British government.
Pitt was now absent from the debate on the Stamp Act. After speaking out against
the peace treaty, he remained secluded at home, experiencing one of his worst attacks of
gout.62 When Parliament voted on the Stamp Act, it was passed easily. 63
A friend of Pitt’s, Lord Chesterfield, wrote to his son about Pitt during the time of
the passage of the Stamp Act that “he is absolutely a cripple all the year, and in violent
pain at least half of it.”64 Pitt’s illness led to his absence during this absolutely crucial
period. Perhaps, if he had been well, he could have delayed the vote or swayed some
members of Parliament as there were members who were hesitant to approve the Stamp
Act. The Stamp Act, however, would rock the relationship between the colonies and her
mother country.
Pitt disagreed with the taxation policies of Parliament after the Seven Years’ War.
He was outraged by the Stamp Act but was powerless to prevent its passage because of
his declining health. There was very little to no opposition in either House of Parliament
to the Stamp Act. One who did oppose it was Colonel Isaac Barre, a member of the
House of Commons and friend of Pitt. He was outraged by the treatment of the
American colonists: “Children planted by your care! No! Your oppression planted them
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in America; they fled from your tyranny… They grew by your neglect of them… now
your prey upon them.”65
According to Edmund Burke, an Irish statesman and eventually an opponent of
taxation on the American Colonies, noted: “I never heard a more languid debate in this
House. No more than two or three gentlemen, as I remember, spoke against the act… In
the House of Lords, I do not recollect that there was any debate or division at all.”66 The
King praised Parliament’s actions in a speech at the closing of Parliament’s session:
“The many bills which you have formed for the improvement and augmentation of the
revenue in its several branches, and the early care which you have taken to discharge a
part of the national debt, are the most effectual methods to establish the public credit
upon the surest foundations, and to alleviate by degrees the burdens of my people.”67
However, the King’s happiness would not continue as news from the colonies poured in.
It is well known that the colonial response from London’s taxation efforts sowed
the seeds for the American Revolution. American colonists were quick to express their
disapproval of the actions of Parliament in London. Colonial governments objected to the
Stamp Act. Patrick Henry of Virginia introduced several resolutions against it in
Virginia’s House of Burgesses. In one resolution, he claimed colonists had the same
rights as citizens living in Britain: “That by two royal Charters, granted by King James
the First, the Colonists aforesaid are declared entitled to all the Liberties, Priviledges, and
Immunities of Denizens and natural Subjects, as if they had been abiding and born within
65
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the Realm of England.”68 Continuing his argument against the Stamp tax in another
resolution, he claimed taxes could be enacted “…by persons chosen by themselves to
represent them.”69 Five of Henry’s resolutions were passed by the House of Burgesses.
Soon Henry’s resolutions were reprinted throughout the colonies. They appeared
in newspapers in two major cities, Boston and New York, along with The Newport
Mercury in Rhode Island and The Maryland Gazette. Other colonial legislatures now
passed their own resolutions against the Stamp tax. In Pennsylvania one resolution
evidenced extreme colonial displeasure: “That the vesting and Authority in the Courts of
Admiralty to decide in Suits relating to the Stamp Duty, and other Matters foreign to their
proper Jurisdiction, is highly dangerous to the Liberties of his Majesty’s American
Subjects, contrary to Magna Charta, the great Charter and Fountain of English Liberty,
and destructive of one of their most darling and acknowledged Rights, that of Trials by
Juries.”70 Meanwhile the Massachusetts Colonial Assembly passed its own resolutions,
including the following: “That no man can justly take the property of another without his
consent; and that upon this original principle the right of representation in the same body,
which exercises the power of making laws for levying taxes, which is one of the main
pillars of the British constitution, is evidently founded.”71 News that colonial legislatures
had enacted legislation denying the constitutionality of the Stamp tax reached Britain.
The Lords of Commissioners of Trade and Plantations in a report on December of 1765
to Parliament complained of the colonial reaction to the Stamp Act: “That the assemblies
68
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of both Massachusetts Bay and New York, had their resolutions and proceedings treated
the acts and legislature of Great Britain with the most indecent disrespect.”72
Throughout the colonies, especially in the northern region, colonists protested the
tax with the rallying cry, “No taxation without representation!” In addition to passing
resolutions arguing against the constitutionality of the Stamp Tax, throughout the
colonies non-importation agreements or boycotts of British goods began. At the New
York City Merchants Meeting, the group passed a non-importation agreement on October
31, 1765. The agreement read: “Resolved, That in all orders they send out to Great
Britain for goods or merchandise of any nature, kind, or quality whatsoever, usually
imported from Great Britain, they will direct their correspondents not to ship them unless
the Stamp Act be repealed…It is further unanimously agreed that no merchant will vend
[sell] any goods or merchandise sent upon commission from Great Britain that shall be
shipped from thence after the first day of January next unless upon the condition
mentioned in the first resolution.”73
Multiple reports from the Board of Trade from 1765 identified colonial anger
generated by the Stamp Act. A letter from the colonies to the Board of Trade describes
the colonial reaction to the tax: “(It) was discovered hanging upon a tree, in a street in the
town, an effigy, with inscriptions, shewing that it was intended to represent Mr. Oliver
the secretary, who had lately accepted the office of stamp distributor.” The letter also
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states that the sheriff’s officers could not take it down, “without imminent danger of their
lives.”74
At the same time, representatives from nine of the thirteen colonies met in New
York City. This meeting would become known as the Stamp Act Congress. The
Congress passed a series of resolutions in which delegates pledged their loyalty to the
King, while at the same time asserting their rights as British citizens. They argued against
the constitutionality of the Stamp Act. They petitioned the King to have Parliament repeal
the Stamp Act asking him “…to procure the repeal of the act for granting and applying
certain stamp duties.”75 Once the tax was repealed the representatives believed it would
return peace and prosperity throughout the realm.
As we have seen, the majority of British statesmen supported the Stamp Act at the
time of its passage. There was little debate as many statesmen believed that, “…support is
due in return for protection that every subject should contribute to the common
defense”76 Many statesmen worried about the added cost of continued protection of the
colonies after war. Estimates ranged from three to four hundred thousand pounds
annually for the protection and defense of the now larger American colonies by installing
approximately ten thousand troops throughout the region. However, as unrest broke out
in the colonies, leaders in Britain faced a difficult and novel situation.
Ministry and colonial political leaders held potentially irreconcilable differences
on costs of imperial defense on one hand, appearances of arbitrary taxation on the other.
The American colonists denied the right of Parliament to legislate and tax them in this
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new fashion. Leaders in Britain essentially refuted the colonial argument, believing that
colonial legislatures were subordinate to Parliament. When colonists protested against the
measures taken to collect funds for the Empire, the government and its leaders were
shocked. They did not foresee the negative colonists’ reaction towards the new trade and
tax regulations. Some in Britain viewed the colonial reaction and subsequent protest and
rebellion as an insult to Britain. This was especially true for Grenville, who believed that
protection and obedience were reciprocal. The British offered protection to the colonists,
and in return the colonists should be obedient to the British.77
The colonies did not have an army or navy of any kind; they would have been
easily defeated by the French and their Native American allies. Prior to the British arrival
in North America, Washington and his colonial milita had failed miserably against the
French and the Native American allies. Without British intervention in the situation in the
Ohio Valley, the colonists would have been on their own to defend themselves from the
French and their Native American allies. In addition to providing for their defense, the
colonists also reaped tremendous advantages as a result of Britain evacuating the French
from North America.
On one level, lack of American enthusiasm for novel financial contributions
should not have been surprising. As previously discussed in chapter two, throughout the
Seven Years’ War, colonial cooperation with Britain was less than expected. There were
many requests made to colonial legislatures for troops to assist the British Army.
Generals frequently reported back to London that legislatures failed to raise a sufficient
number of troops, nor did they do so in a timely manner. The colonies seemed to
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decouple Britain’s military efforts in North America from any sense of imperial
obligation.
There was clearly an established pattern of colonial unwillingness to help pay for
expenses such imperial defense. Colonists were able to contribute to their own defense as
evidenced by their ability to purchase and increase the demand for British goods
throughout the eighteenth century. When it came to assisting the British cause in the war,
colonists were only willing to contribute when promised redress of their costs by the
British government. This was promised by Pitt in letters to colonial leaders throughout
the duration of the war. Therefore, by rarely pressing the issue of colonial contribution, it
set the foundation for colonial resistance to contributing to the imperial needs. Now,
when the time came for colonists to contribute to post war recovery efforts, they resisted.
Just as he had effectively ignored the financial costs of the Seven Years’ War in pursuit
of victory, Pitt had also insulated colonies from understanding the costs of the war. Now
when asked to pay to contribute to the Empire as their counterparts at home did, colonists
refused. This forced leaders to then tax the colonists to generate revenue for colonial
defense.
Leaders in Parliament needed to respond to the colonial reaction to the Stamp
Tax. Benjamin Franklin, speaking to Parliament, tried to explain why colonists reached
as they did: “The Stamp Act says, we shall have no commerce, make no exchange of
property with each other, neither purchase nor grant, nor recover debts; we shall neither
marry not make our wills, unless we pay such sums and thus it is intended to extort our
money from us, or ruin us by the consequence of refusing to pay it.”78 Paying for seals
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for documents such as marriage licenses, wills, deeds and contracts were all forced upon
the colonists without their consent. They saw this as a denial of their rights as British
subjects.
Not all British statesmen agreed with Grenville’s plan to alleviate the financial
strain caused by the Seven Years’ War. William Pitt would return to political life from
the illness that kept him home during the crucial period after his war. He was needed to
restructure British colonial policy. All in all, British leaders were forced to re-evaluate
the measures imposed by the Grenville ministry and determine the best course of action
to deal with the rising costs of the administration of the American colonies.
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Chapter 4 – Crisis with the Colonies
As we have seen, the victory Pitt had worked tirelessly to achieve over the French
in 1763, changed the Empire, but Pitt was unable to develop an imperial vision when it
came to the colonies across the Atlantic Ocean. He resigned from office as peace was
negotiated and agreed upon in Paris, and the new King, George III, formed a peacetime
ministry without Pitt.
When Pitt left office at the end of the Seven Years’ War, he had helped to create
the largest and strongest empire in the world. Britain was a colonial powerhouse with
territory stretching across the globe, but his overall vision was frustrated.1 Throughout
the peace negotiations, Pitt saw the importance of the North American continent for the
Empire. He supported the removal of the French from Canada for the protection of the
British colonies and trade between those colonies and the mother country.2 Both Britain
and the colonies had long benefited from their economic connection, and Pitt wished to
see this connection continue. However, the new ministry would be forced to focus on the
economic impacts of the war. This would set in motion a series of events that would
forever change the Empire. We will see that the King would recall Pitt to office to serve
his country again, but when he returned in 1766, great damage had already been done to
the relationship between Britain and her colonies. The situation was quite precarious. As
events transpired, Pitt would prove unequal to the task of preventing a drastic imperial
fracture. Pitt would not be the effective leader during peacetime as he once was during
wartime.
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Upon the commencement of Pitt’s ministry in 1766, the King had elevated him to
peerage as 1st Earl of Chatham. Pitt’s acceptance of a peerage would greatly impact the
rest of his career. The London Gazette announced his title in an article which read: “St.
James’s Place, July 30. The King has been pleased to grant unto the Right Honourable
William Pitt, and heirs male, the dignity of a Viscount and Earl of Great Britain, by the
name, style and title of Viscount Pitt, of Burton-Pynsent, in the county of Somerset, and
Earl of Chatham, Kent.”3 The impact of a transition from the House of Commons to the
House of Lords would greatly affect Pitt’s abilities within the government and court of
public opinion. Friends and supporters disliked his move from the House of Commons to
the House of Lords. Many Britons felt betrayed by Pitt’s actions. The “Great Commonor”
was no more after accepting an earldom. His political allies felt he had more authority
and creditability within the Commons, as they believed he could not be as an effective
leader in the Lords, especially due to his failing health.4
The colonies had changed demographically, economically, and politically since
their establishments, sometimes over a century ago. Chatham failed to understand both
the financial issues of the Empire and the growing disconnect between Britain and her
colonies. 5 The colonists had in fact transplanted British social, political, and economic
institutions to the colonies.6 Despite that, over time the colonies had developed their own
distinct identity. British culture had merged with others as the colonies were a safe haven
for refugees from across Europe. The population was made up of a variety of different
nationalities, ethnicities, and religious groups. By 1760, two-thirds of the population in
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the colonies was American-born. Many were second, third, and fourth generation
Americans.7 This generation did not have as strong a connection to the mother country as
the earlier generations. Many had never stepped foot anywhere in Europe, including
Britain. By the mid-eighteenth century the population had exploded in the colonies. The
population of the colonies was doubling every thirty years.8 Thus the colonies developed
their own culture and heritage.9
The colonists were no longer the just transplanted Britons. Colonists were
wealthier and more powerful than the previous generations.10 They were more
successful, prosperous, and growing.11 The colonies were economically and politically
mature.12 They saw themselves as equal to Englishmen living in the mother country,
believing they were entitled to the same rights. 13
The growing divide between the colonies and the mother country cannot be
denied. This was exacerbated by events that occurred in the aftermath of the Seven
Years’ War. When changes to the Empire were made, the colonists refused to accept
what Parliament enacted as a result of the war. After the crisis associated with the Stamp
Act, conditions had forever changed between Britain and her colonies. The colonists were
not willing to contribute towards the Empire by the methods imposed by Grenville and
Townshend, nor were they willing to accept previous commercial regulations that had
been established over the past century. The relationship was forever changed as
compromise became almost impossible. Chatham championed conciliation, though he
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was in the minority on both sides of the Atlantic. He nonetheless did so until his last
breath.
There was much unrest throughout the colonies after the passage of the Stamp
Act, with protests and riots occurring throughout 1765. Letters and petitions were sent to
Parliament against the Stamp Act and shared with members throughout the year.
Merchants, manufacturers, ship owners, and seamen throughout Britain joined with their
American counterparts in protesting the new duty, especially after the American colonists
organized boycotts of British goods. Changes needed to be made to halt the actions of the
colonists, and the King looked to Chatham for assistance. According to the Duke of
Newcastle, in June of 1765, the Duke of Grafton was sent to Pitt to bring him to the King.
Grafton found him “very lame with the gout in both of his feet.” The seriousness of the
illness prevented him from accepting the king’s call. 14 With Chatham sidelined
indefinitely, the King looked to Lord Rockingham to step in as Prime Minister. This
continued the cycle of ministerial instability throughout the crucial decade.
As soon as Rockingham accepted the position, Grenville was forced to resign
after the uproar his Stamp Act caused throughout the Empire. Now four distinct factions
existed in the Parliament. Two allied groups were led respectively by the ousted Lord
Grenville and the Duke of Bedford, while the Duke of Newcastle led what remained of
the Old Whig party, which with Chatham, had dominated the wartime ministry.15 Lord
Rockingham’s faction was in control of the new ministry, and Chatham nominally allied
himself with that faction.
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Rockingham had been advised by Lord Shelburne to end the enforcement of the
Stamp Act as it was detrimental to commerce. Lord Shelburne, who was very familiar
with the economic relationship between Britain and the colonies from his days on the
Board of Trade, emphasized to Rockingham the need to “open commerce and restore
tranquility to America.”16 Chatham, insofar as his health permitted, worked with
Rockingham and his administration to achieve this end. He spoke out against the tax in
letters to friends as well as in debates in Parliament. In a letter to Lord Shelburne in
December of 1765, he told his friend and colleague of his concerns regarding the damage
the Stamp Act tax had brought to the relationship between Britain and her colonies: “I
fear the very air of this mother-country breathes too much partial resentment against
those unhappy men, provoked to madness.”17 In spite of his debilitations he was
determined to contribute to the debates, telling his friend Thomas Nuthall that he would
return to speak out against the state of American affairs even ‘if I have to crawl or be
carried.”18
January of 1766, proved crucial to dissection of the Stamp Act. Grenville, in the
opposition, still spoke in support of the measure. He stated it was in the authority of
Parliament to tax the American colonies. He reiterated the need for the colonies to
contribute their fair share to imperial defense, particularly in light of the benefits they had
received from the late war: “The nation has run itself into an immense debt to give them
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this protection; and now they are called upon to contribute a small share towards the
public expense.”19
Chatham’s position was somewhat precarious. On the one hand, he could hardly
gainsay the need to pay the costs accrued during the war. At the same time, he believed
the Stamp Act had represented an arbitrary tax on the American colonies, and he was not
prepared to abandon principles for financial expediency. He believed Parliament had no
right to tax the colonies without representation. However, he firmly believed that
Parliament had the right to regulate commerce as it always had. Therefore, duties could
be imposed.20 He thus urged Parliament to “bound the colonies by her laws, by her
regulations and restrictions in trade, in navigation, in many in everything else – except
that of taking their money of their pockets without their consent.”21 In this speech
Chatham was making a distinction between taxes for the purpose of collecting revenue
and duties for the purpose of regulating trade. Each year, he argued, Britain took in over
two million pounds from its trade with the American colonies. That, he believed was
payment enough for protection.22 Grenville responded, “A tax is a tax… there was no
distinction between internal and external taxation.”23
Chatham resumed his speech in response to Grenville’s rebuttal. He applauded the
colonists’ response to what he believed was an unjust tax. Furthermore, he believed he
had imperial precedent on his side. He drew members’ attention to Wales, which was not
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taxed until it was officially incorporated into the United Kingdom in 1536. Why, he
wondered, should America be any different?24 The colonies lacked representatives in
Parliament; therefore, they could not be internally taxed for the purpose of collecting
revenue. He dismissed the idea that American colonists were virtually represented:
“There is an idea in some, that the colonies are virtually represented in the House. I
would fain know by whom an American is represented here?”25
Chatham believed in the supremacy of Parliament as well as in the principle of
representation. In his speech against the Stamp Act, he asserted that Parliament should
repeal the offending legislation, but that it could still assert its authority over the colonies.
His overriding belief was that imperial trade offered the panacea necessary to alleviate
the debt, while keeping the colonies in a position subservient to London. He was
convinced that “the whole commercial system of America may be altered to
advantage.”26 However, he did not offer any suggestions or solutions as to how the
system could be changed to appease both sides. He also failed to recognize that the
moneys generated by trade with the colonies were insufficient for meeting imperial
military needs, and fell short of levels needed to recoup the enormous debt created during
the war.
In the end, the Stamp tax was repealed as Chatham had been able to sway enough
votes to attain that result. The repeal passed seventy-three to sixty-one in the House of
Lords.27 However, he did not have the same power he once had earlier in his career, nor
did he have an economic plan to actually raise revenue with the Stamp Act now dead.
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Those in the opposition, the Bedforities and Grenvilites, warned that the action of
Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act could potentially lead to a colonial revolt against all
acts of trade previously established.28 They were right in their worries as it seemed that
colonists were against any measure established by Parliament to raise new revenues.
Despite the repeal of the Stamp Act, Parliament would continue to assert its right
to both legislate for and tax the colonies.29 The Rockingham Administration’s next
attempt to achieve those ends was the Declaratory Act, which was meant to maintain the
idea of colonial subordination to the British crown and Parliament. The Act stated that
the crown and Parliament had full authority to make laws for the colonies, and it was
passed on the same day the Stamp Act was repealed, March 17, 1766.30
The purpose of the act was to deal with the inconsistency of colonial recognition
of Parliament’s authority in the colonies.31 This in effect bound the colonies to Britain
and reiterated colonial subordination to the crown and Parliament. Interestingly, the act
never directly used the words “taxation” or “taxes”. The Act established that while
colonial charters gave the colonists the ability to govern themselves, this did not make the
colonial governments independent of Parliament.32 The act specifically stated: “The
British parliament had, hath and of right ought to have full power and authority to make
laws to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever.”33 The act passed, but was never
enforced by the Rockingham administration.
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Leaders in Britain also learned the colonists’ distinction between internal and
external taxes, which they believed prepared them for future legislation and methods of
raising revenue. Colonists were willing to accept external taxes such as duties that were
established by the various acts of trade, but they were adamantly against all internal taxes
for the purpose of raising revenue. Benjamin Franklin, who was a friend of Chatham’s,
agreed on the difference between internal and external measures.
Speaking before Parliament, Franklin asserted the difference during the debate
over the Stamp Act: “I think the difference is great. An external tax is a duty laid on
commodities imported; that duty is added to the first cost… makes a part of the price. If
people do not like it at that price, they refuse it; they are not obligated to pay it. But an
internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, if not laid by their own
representatives.”34 It was clear that policies that had worked in the British West Indies
and some policies that had even worked at one point in the American colonies were no
longer acceptable.35 There was a need to make a fundamental change in British policy
and administration of the colonies.
This was a turning point in the relationship between Britain and her American
colonies. Prior to 1763, colonists had rarely objected to any of the major policies,
regulations, or laws imposed by the British Parliament. Some examples of colonial
acquiescence to Parliament’s authority to legislate in the colonies were the series of
Navigation Acts, the Woolen Act of 1699, Coinage Act of 1708, Post Office 1710, Debt
Act and Hat Act of 1732, Paper Money Act of 1751, and the Sugar Act of 1754. 36 By
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contrast, the American colonists reacted negatively and almost immediately to the
passage of the Stamp Act. Parliament was flooded with repeal petitions from both
colonists and British merchants.37
The colonists organized boycotts of British goods to show their unhappiness with
the Stamp Act, and the colonial boycott led to further financial difficulties in Britain.
Merchants and manufacturers were devastated by the boycott of British goods. One
man’s petition to Parliament spoke of the merchants of London’s concerns about the
unfolding recession. The petition stated that the Stamp Act “had so far interrupted the
usual and former fruitful branches of their commerce.”38 Many were shocked by the
reaction of the colonists and the unified front that they displayed during the Stamp Act
Congress in October of 1765. It was especially unsettling because an attempt at unity in
Albany was rejected just a few years earlier.39 Now the colonists were exhibiting a more
united front than ever before.
The repeal of the Stamp Act and the introduction of the Declaratory Act did not
solve the economic and financial difficulties. Britain still needed to deal with the debt
from the Seven Years’ War and the revenue needed for continued defense and
administration of the empire.40 However, with their “victory” over the Stamp Act, it
seemed that the colonists were not willing to accept economic and commercial
regulations similar to the ones in place prior to the mid eighteenth century. Somehow
leaders in Britain needed to balance the needs and wants of both the mother country and
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her colonies. The cement of the Empire, the Navigation Acts and commercial system,
seemed to be crumbling.41
Even if the new regulations were similar in nature to the previous acts of trade,
the colonists were not willing to accept them. There was permanent damage done to the
economic relationship. Colonial boycotts hurt the already suffering economy. Lord
Chesterfield wrote to his son of the concerns about the damaged trade relationship as a
result of the Stamp Act and colonial boycotts: “Our trade with them will not be, for some
years, what it used to be.”42
The period of the Rockingham administration contributed to the apparent peace
and equilibrium between the Britain and the colonists, but it was chimerical. The
administration had asserted the principle of imperial supremacy over the colonies with
the Declaratory Act, but this contained no new policies to address the financial
situation.43 Therefore, the colonists had little to protest, and a period of uneasy peace
developed. The colonists were certainly suspicious of the Declaratory Act, but so long as
the Rockingham administration ignored the root problem, calm prevailed.
This proved to be dangerous procrastination. Not only did the government need to
worry about the financial constraints and the lack of a strong imperial policy, a growing
concern was that it seemed American colonists would not be happy with any regulation
or legislation that Westminster enacted relating to them. This was a concern of Lord
Lyttelton, a MP, who believed that Parliament should never have agitated the colonies
with the Stamp Act in the first place. He worried now that colonists would be resistant to
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any measures enacted by Parliament: “But it is said they will not submit to the Stamp
Act as it lay an internal tax: if this be admitted, the same reasoning could extend to all
acts of parliament. The Americans will find themselves crampt by the Acts of
Navigation, and oppose that too.”44 Chatham agreed believing that “Grenville
antagonized the Americans.”45
The attitude of colonists seemed unjust after a century or more of good relations
and mutual benefits to both parties involved. It seemed as though the colonists forgot
what the British offered in terms of military protection from enemies such as France and
Native American groups, as well as the economic advantages gained by their ties to the
British. This became a serious issue for the British moving forward, as it seemed every
move by the imperial government upset the colonists. Lord Mansfield told Parliament,
“The British legislature have in every instance exercised their right of legislation over
them without any dispute or question until the 14th of January last.”46 Mansfield, like
Chatham and Lyttleton, worried that colonial resistance was strengthening. With each
attempt at establishing an imperial policy after the Stamp Act, colonists reacted with
anger which further strained the relationship.
The King, unhappy with the administration, turned to Chatham. He hoped, that in
spite of his infirmities, the great war minister could settle the peacetime crisis by forming
a government as prime minister. Hearing of this, Rockingham resigned his position after
failing to find a resolution with the colonies. The Declaratory Act was passed, but it
failed to result in concrete policies. Nonetheless, seeds of distrust amongst the colonists
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had been sown.47 The King was putting great trust in Chatham but should have
recognized that he had never been a particularly adept parliamentary manager, and that
his health would inevitably force him to rely on subordinates. Contemporaries were
mindful of these risks. A letter from William Gerard Hamilton to John Calcraft, offers an
insight on Chatham’s leadership: “He is certainly the best minister in the world, but for
those who wish to share in the rule and government of the country, he is the worst.”48
Chatham, nonetheless, launched his administration with broad authority and some
popular support. Many were excited about his return to office and were confident he
would succeed. Lord Chesterfield wrote to his son, and quoted Grafton’s assessment of
Chatham: “He knew but one man who could give them that strength and solidarity; that,
under this person he should be willing to serve in any capacity, not only as a general
officer, but as a pioneer, and would take up a spade and a mattock.”49 One of Chatham’s
goals was to end factions, and so he worked on creating an administration based on merit
rather than party.
Lord Camden was made Chancellor, the Duke of Grafton was made the head of
the Treasury, the Earl of Shelburne was made Secretary of State in the Southern
Department, while General Conway was made Secretary of State for the Northern
Department.50 Most importantly, Charles Townshend was made Chancellor of the
Exchequer. This appointment would forever impact the relationship between Britain and
her American colonies.
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Chatham had the support of the King and great popularity in the American
Colonies.51 However, he seemed to be losing his support at home when he accepted
peerage and became the Earl of Chatham. Again Lord Chesterfield described the loss of
popularity of the “Great Commoner”: “Mr. Pitt has, by his dignity of earl, lost the
greatest part of his popularity, especially in the city; and I believe the opposition will be
very strong.”52 Lord Chesterfield was correct as many Englishmen who had celebrated
Pitt as the “Great Commoner” disliked seeing him as a titled peer.53 Nonetheless, his
great priority was to repair the rift with the American colonies. It is here that a particular
contrast must be drawn between Chatham’s aspiration for accommodation with the
American colonies on the one hand, and the physical and political limitations he faced on
the other. The centerpiece of his program vis-à-vis America must be described first.
Chatham hoped to create an American Department and therefore establish a third
Secretary of State Position for America.54 He wanted to create this position to alleviate
the workload for the Secretary of State for the Southern Department whose
responsibilities were already great. This person could focus solely on the American
colonies. While it is impossible to know whether the establishment of a cabinet-level
position to manage American affairs would have diminished or delayed the crisis with the
colonies or not, two points are worth our consideration. The first is that such an executive
position would have been consistent with Chatham’s aforementioned insistence on
imperial oversight of the colonies, while relieving American anxieties regarding
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parliamentary legislation. In an imperial context, the government of Ireland stood as a
near template.55 We have already seen that Chatham was steadfast in his belief that
revenues generated from excises and imperial trade offered the solution to the financial
crisis. These need not entail introducing new taxes on the Americans via the Westminster
Parliament, which had been the great cause of American concerns surrounding the Stamp
Tax. Chatham’s diminished health prevented him from carrying the proposal any further.
Nonetheless, and this is the second point, the essential kernels of Chatham’s
concept did not die entirely and would be revived nearly two decades later by his
Southern Secretary of State, Lord Shelburne. In 1782, now Prime Minister, Lord
Shelburne, offered the victorious Thirteen Colonies a commercial treaty that would have
opened British ports to American ships in return for unfettered British access to
American markets. This de-facto proposal for a “customs union” (which faced
tremendous domestic opposition and soon died) was unquestionably inspired by
Chatham’s belief in trade as the glue that held the old empire together.56 In the end,
however, it was Prime Minister Chatham’s incapacities in 1766 and 1767 which laid
waste to these earlier measures.
His growing health problems, combined with his loss of popularity after accepting
earldom, prevented him and his administration from accomplishing what they set out to
do at the onset of the ministry. As soon as Chatham’s administration was established, he
was sidelined by another severe episode of gout. In a letter to the King in July, he
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expressed his hope to recover quickly and return to London immediately.57 In the end,
Chatham would be almost invisible during his own administration, leaving its members
leaderless and without direction.58 Lord Chesterfield described the administration in
another letter to his son: “I can give you no account of our political world, which is in a
situation that I never saw in my whole life. Lord Chatham has been so ill these last
months that he has not been able, some say unwilling, to do or hear any business… they
cannot, or dare not, do any without his direction… so everything is now at a stand. This
situation cannot stand much longer.”59 Chatham was aloof, unpredictable, and
inconsistent during his brief administration.60
During his time away from office, he was described as sitting at a table all day,
head bowed and faced covered. The slightest noises frightened him and made his body
tremble. Talk of politics caused his whole body to convulse.61 In a letter to his wife, he
informed her that meetings were too much for his condition. He told her he was to “shut
his door till I am quite free from fever.”62 He spent weeks and months at a time ill at his
home, especially in late 1766 and early 1767, and experienced a lengthy period of manic
depression and insanity. 63 He was incapable of taking action, making decisions, and
giving advice or counsel.64 His bouts were more frequent and lengthier than in the past.
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The gloom and melancholy worsened with each experience with his illness.65 He was no
longer healthy enough for lengthy and heated debates for which he had once been known,
and which were instrumental in his rise to power.66 His speeches once gained followers
and support for his agenda and policies, but now, he no longer could speak as
passionately as he once had earlier in his career. He could not compose coherent letters,
orders, or advice.67 Letters were often received in the penmanship of his secretary or
Lady Chatham. He wrote to Colonel Barre stating that he could barely gain the strength
to work a few hours.68 These were not the characteristics of a man who could save the
British Empire. His illness kept him a recluse for over a year. These absences and
instability led to the eventual downfall of the Chatham Administration.
The priority of Chatham’s administration was to implement a policy for the large
and powerful Empire he helped to create. As a result of his illness and subsequent
absences, Chatham failed to seize the opportunity to develop and establish a new colonial
policy that would save the British Empire and be suitable and accepted by both Britain
and her colonies. Continental and American colonial policies were floundering and in
disarray as no action had been taken since the repeal of Stamp Act and Parliament
enacting of the Declaratory Act.69 No imperial policy was developed or presented. He
failed to end the divide between political factions between the Grenvillites, Bedfordites,
and Rockinghamites within Britain. He faced enormous opposition from these political

65

Green, William Pitt, 295.
Williams, The Life of William Pitt, 215.
67
Ibid, 234.
68
Letter from William Pitt to Colonel Barre – September 20, 1766, printed in Taylor & Pringle, ed.,
Correspondences of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham.
69
Schweizer, “A Review of Pitt the Elder by Jeremy Black”, 711.
66

102

factions. Chatham’s declining health made the administration often times leaderless.70 In
a speech years later, Edmund Burke stated that “his whole system was on a wide sea,
without chart or compass.”71 Instead other members of his administration planned their
own policies while Chatham was incapable. These policies would continue to strain the
relationship that Chatham hoped to repair during his administration
Chatham’s illness allowed for the rise of Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, who would propose a new act that would eventually be named after him.
Townshend began his political career as many others had in Parliament. In 1748, he was
granted a position on the Board of Trade. In the years leading up to his appointment as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, he served in various positions in the government, including
the First Lord of the Treasury and Paymaster General, a position previously held by
Chatham.72 After rejecting a position in the Grenville administration, Townshend
accepted Chatham’s offer to become Chancellor of the Exchequer in August of 1766.73
When Chatham went into seclusion at his home as a result of illness, Townshend
launched his own agenda. In Parliament he proposed a new act in an effort to recoup the
cost of both the late war and the growing costs of defense and administration of the
colonies. Duties would be placed on various products imported by the colonies, such as
lead, paper, glass, paint, and tea.74
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Townshend’s plan for the colonies was the exact opposite of Chatham’s views
and intentions.75 Had Chatham been well, Townshend’s rise and policies could have been
prevented.76 Burke commented that whenever Chatham was forced to withdraw from
office due to his persistent illness, “Principles directly contrary of his own were sure to
predominate.”77 This is exactly what happened with Chatham and Townshend.
Townshend reversed Chatham’s work with America.78 Townshend’s measures were in
effect efforts to hide the taxes as external measures, similar to the various Acts of
Navigation rather than internal tax such the controversial Stamp Tax. He hoped colonists
would view them as duties and not as direct taxes. Chatham wanted time to review and
research the policies but Townshend forged ahead while his chief was incapacitated.79
The Duke of Grafton, serving as Treasurer for the Chatham Administration, was
the de facto leader of the ministry, and frequently reached out to Chatham for advice,
especially on the plans Townshend was laying. However, Chatham often did not
respond. Other members of the administration also reached out to Chatham. Lord
Shelburne reached out to the Prime Minister to warn him of Townshend’s plans as they
knew Chatham would be opposed to the taxes Townshend attempted to disguise as
commercial duties. Chatham managed to travel to London. However, his travels
exhausted him and weakened his effectiveness. He failed to remove Townshend and
replace him with Lord North as he had hoped.80 He would remain secluded in London for
while Townshend continued his efforts. All the while his administration was leaderless
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and divided. Shelburne and Grafton were opposed to the measures of the Townshend Act.
His administration soon began to crumple as Shelburne began the trend of members of
the administration resigning their positions. Shelburne was a key loss as he was a great
source of knowledge on the colonies after serving with the Board of Trade for many
years. Without Chatham present, the Townshend duties passed by one hundred eighty
votes to ninety-eight.81 Instead of repairing the relationship during Chatham’s own
administration, relationships were further strained as a result of the Townshend duties. It
is ironic that the breach between the colonies and Britain actually grew during the
Chatham administration.
The Townshend Acts or duties were passed in 1767 by Parliament. They created
duties on goods such as lead, paper, paint, tea and glass that were imported from Britain
by the colonists. They would most directly impact cities and trading towns, especially in
the northern colonies such as New York and Massachusetts.82
On one level, this new package was familiar to American colonists. This was
trade regulation similar to various measures that had been passed in the previous century
without colonial resistance. What Townshend and his supporters failed to appreciate,
however, were the changing political realities that impacted Westminster’s capacity to
legislate for the American colonies.
The Townshend Acts evoked the same response in the colonies that the Stamp
Act did two years before. Even though this was not a direct tax as the Stamp Act had
been, the colonies still vehemently protested the Townshend Acts. They once again
protested believing their rights were being denied. They clamored again, “No taxation
81
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without representation!” Along with rioting and protesting, the colonists also reinstituted
non-importation or boycotts of all British goods. Merchants in Boston first instituted a
non-importation of British goods. According to the Boston Non-Importation Agreement,
merchants and traders would “… not send for or import any kind of goods or
merchandise from Great Britain… will not purchase of any factors, or others, any kind of
goods imported from Great Britain.”83 Soon other colonial cities such as New York and
Philadelphia adopted the same measures.
Merchants in New York City followed their fellow colonists in Boston by
reinstating the non-importation agreement as a result of the Townshend duties. The nonimportation agreement in New York City reads, “… and this City to restrict the
Importation of Goods from Great Britain until the acts of Parliament laying Duties on
Paper, Glass, & c. were repealed… and thinking it our Duty to exert ourselves by all
lawful Means to maintain and obstruct our just Rights and Privileges, which we claim
under our most excellent Constitution as Englishmen, not to be taxed but by our own
Consent or that of our Representatives…”84 Once again, colonists were rejecting the
actions of Parliaments as they believed their fundamental rights as Englishmen were
being denied.
The famous patriot leader Samuel Adams instituted the Massachusetts Circular
Letter. In the letter Adams wrote: “…that the Acts made there, imposing duties on the
people of this province, with the sole and express purpose of raising a revenue, are
infringements of their natural and constitutional rights; because, as they are not
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represented in the British Parliament, his Majesty's commons in Britain, by those Acts,
grant their property without their consent.”85 Another colonial leader from Pennsylvania,
John Dickinson, called for unity among the colonies: “The cause of one is the cause of
all.”86 The unified front of the colonists would eventually force leaders back in London
to reevaluate the duties enacted under the Townshend Acts.
Chatham was once again against this measure to tax the colonies without their
consent. Herein lies the inconsistencies of Chatham and his position. He was more than
well aware of the government’s debt that resulted from his global war and understood
that the debts needed to be paid. At the same time he recognized that the colonies must
contribute their fair share towards to maintenance and defense of the empire. However, as
time went on, Chatham hardened in his belief that London could not legislate for, or tax,
the American colonies.
Chatham had proven that he could win a global war but was unsure how to
manage the effects of that war during peacetime. He failed to develop an imperial policy
for the administration for the greatly enlarged Empire nor did he deal with the financial
issues of the Empire. Now ill-health and incapacities would all but remove him from the
equation. In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the Townshend Acts, Chatham
failed to return to office. Shelburne wrote to Lady Chatham inquiring about her
husband’s’ thoughts about the current colonial policy and relationship with the colonies.
However, Lady Chatham responded that she “wished she could know her husband’s
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opinion, but his state of health prevented it.”87 Chatham remained in seclusion until 1768.
Lord Chesterfield commented to his son, “Lord Chatham has neither seen nor spoken to
anyone, and has been in the oddest way in the world.”88 He finally agreed to see Grafton,
who was appalled by his condition. Chatham continued to refuse to meet with the King.
He even refused to let his wife see him, having his meals served to him through a hatch.89
Clearly, Chatham was unable to direct a country and an Empire as he secluded himself at
home for the majority of his administration. His administration was described as
“ridiculous” by many statesmen.90
After two years out of the public eye due to his ever declining physical and
mental health, he returned in the spring of 1768 after being absent the majority of his
administration.91 He had recovered from his illness and returned to London only to
resign his position on October 14, 1768, ending the Chatham Ministry. His administration
lasted two years and three months, but Chatham actually served only eight months.92 The
Chatham ministry failed after neglecting to achieve the goals set forth to improve both
foreign and domestic affairs. In fact, the relationship with the colonies was further
damaged as a result of his absence, factions were further divided, and Britain was on the
outside of Continental European affairs.
After the fall of Chatham’s Administration, he was an outsider in British politics.
He tried to be visible and was heard in Parliament from time to time. He was not finished
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with politics even though after 1768 he did not hold political office. He was not content
to retire and continued to speak and debate in Parliament using his oratory skills after his
resignation. However, his body and mind were weakened by his frequent and lengthy
illnesses. He returned to court in time to voice his displeasure about the affairs of the
colonies to the King and politicians.93 He often tried to argue the difference between
internal and external taxation. He consistently opposed any new duties on the colonies,
but without political office, he was powerless.
Having his start in Parliament in 1756, Fredrick, Lord North was eventually
commissioned to the Treasury Board in 1759. It was during his time on the Treasury
Board that he became attuned to the finances of Britain and her Empire. He stayed on
throughout the brief ministries of both Bute and Grenville, eventually resigning as the
Rockingham administration began. He returned to government during the Chatham
Administration. He would succeed Townshend as Chancellor of the Exchequer. After the
fall of Chatham and Grafton’s administration, the king looked to North to become Prime
Minister. On January 30, 1770, North accepted the position, becoming King George III’s
sixth prime minister in less than a decade. Lord North was a very intelligent minister. He
was extremely loyal to the King, and at same time he had a good working relationship
with many of his peers.94
A relative period of calm existed in the colonies during the first few years of
North’s administration, even with the remaining duty on tea that continued after the
repeal of most of the Townshend duties. However, when North became involved with
the bankrupt East India Company, relations between Britain and her colonies were
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strained even further. To save the East India Company, the excess eighteen million
pounds of tea would be sent to the colonies for sale. Originally, it was to be sold directly
to the colonies without the duty. However, North refused to completely remove the duty
as he did not want to remove it for a matter of principal. As a result the Tea Act of 1773
was passed. This reduced the previous duty nearly by half. Even with the added duty, the
tea was sold in the colonies at a bargain price, however, colonists were not satisfied, and
instead they were outraged. Word spread throughout the colonies that new legislation was
passed by Parliament that imposed duties and the period of calm between Britain and her
colonies quickly ended.
The crisis that re-ignited the debate came to be known as the Boston Tea Party,
which occurred on December 16, 1773. Public opinion in Britain registered shock at the
actions of the Bostonians, and Chatham was stunned by the news coming from the
colonies. He, nonetheless, argued for moderation towards the colonies.95 In June 1774, he
told members of Parliament that the colonies were provoked to act against the Tea Act.
When the Stamp Act had been repealed a decade earlier, it had removed the cause of
previous conflict between Britain and her colonies. Now, however, the renewed efforts
to tax the colonies were forcing open rebellion.96 According to Chatham, the colonists
were educated and knowledgeable about the British constitution; therefore, they knew
their rights as Englishmen and were willing to fight when their rights were encroached
upon as they were by another attempt at taxation by Parliament.97 The colonists believed
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their rights were denied as they were taxed by a Parliament that lacked colonial
representation: “They (colonists) are subjects of this kingdom, equally entitled with
yourselves to all the natural rights of mankind and the peculiar privileges of Englishmen.
Equally bound by its laws, and equally participating of the constitution of this free
country.”98
Even though he was not happy by the news from Boston, Chatham was not
supportive of coercive measures being imposed on the colonists. He believed coercion
would only alienate the colonies further from their mother country instead of mending the
broken relationship between the two. He urged Parliament not to provoke the colonies
any further.99 However, he was no longer in a position to control or implement policy as
North’s government moved to impose order in America. North took decisive action after
the Tea Party, something he believed was needed after failures of previous
administrations. North’s administration’s response became known as the Coercive Acts,
and these were enacted by a series of laws passed by Parliament in the first half of 1774.
These measures pushed Britain and her colonies further apart.
On March 31, 1774, the first of the Coercive Acts was passed by Parliament. This
act was the Boston Port Act.100 The Boston Port Act closed down the Boston Harbor for
punishment for the “tea party” in December of 1773. This act stated that the Boston
Harbor would be closed until the colonists paid for the all the damaged tea. Once the tea
was paid for, the port would be reopened immediately and easily.101 Chatham spoke out
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against the punishment. He argued that punishment of all of Boston was unjust. It was
wrong to punish the innocent for the actions of a few.102
The second Coercive Act was known as the Massachusetts Government Act. This
act was passed on May 20, 1774. The act states, “Be it therefore enacted that from and
after August 1, 1774, so much of the charter (1691) which relates to the time and manner
of electing the assistants or counsellors for the said province, be revoked, ... and that the
offices of all counsellors and assistants, elected and appointed in pursuance thereof, shall
from thenceforth cease and determine.”103 The act stripped the colony of its charter and
appointed a royal governor to seize government control of the colony. No longer could
colonists in the colony elect their leaders; previously elected leaders were stripped of
their positions. It prohibited any meetings throughout Boston and the whole colony of
Massachusetts. This struck a chord with American colonists, as they viewed their rights
to self-govern being stripped.
The third Coercive Act was known as the Administration of Justice Act. This act
was passed on June 2, 1774. This act created an independent administration of justice to
question and to try any person accused in the Massachusetts Bay colony and other New
England colonies. It also granted British soldiers immunity to any criminal prosecution in
the colony of Massachusetts. This would immediately impact the British soldiers who
were tried for murder after the “Boston Massacre” in March of 1770. The Boston
Massacre was the name given by the colonists to a skirmish between British troops and
Bostonians in March of 1770 which resulted in the death of five colonists.
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The British policy of coercion was not intended to be a permanent policy in the
colonies.104 The government had hoped that coercion would restore order in the colonies,
as a short term solution to the problem of colonial misbehavior. However, instead of
isolating Bostonians in Massachusetts in hopes they would give in, it further united the
colonies against the mother country. The unifying of the colonies and the widespread
colonial boycott of British goods was proof that discontent could be found in more than
just Boston or the New England area. It was the hope of colonial leaders that a nonimportation and non-consumption agreement would force British Parliament to revise its
policy towards the colonies.
Although the focus of this thesis is not primarily concerned with America, it is
important to give the reader a brief background on the formation and aims of the
Continental Congress. In response to the Coercive measures enacted by Parliament, the
Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to develop a coordinated response. It was here
that representatives from twelve of the thirteen colonies, fifty-six members in all, met to
discuss the course of action for the colonies. A resolution stated the Congress’s
unhappiness with the coercive policy describing them as: “several late, cruel, and
oppressive Acts have been passed respecting the town of Boston and the Massachusetts
Bay.”105 In order to gain the attention of leaders in London members, of the Continental
Congress resolved: “That from and after the first day of December next, we will not
import into British America, from Great Britain or Ireland, any goods, wares or
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merchandize whatsoever, or from any other place any such goods, wares or merchandize,
as shall have been exported from Great-Britain or Ireland.”106
Chatham was upset by the colonists’ actions; however, he argued in Parliament
that the government’s response to colonial action was unjust.107 Chatham and other
politicians argued against the continuation of coercion as they worried the British and the
American colonists were moving closer to war and separation. He believed that the
Parliament’s actions were not the proper methods to fix the relationship between the
colonies and their mother country. He stated, “The mode which has been pursued to bring
them back to a sense of their duty in the parent state, has been so diametrically opposite
to the fundamental principles of sound policy, that individuals, possess'd of common
understanding, must be astonished at such proceedings.”108 He stated that Parliament had
provoked the colonies time and again, beginning with the Tea Act of 1773. He added,
“That this country had no right under heaven to tax America.” 109
In his speech to Parliament in June 1774, he responded specifically to the news of
the Boston Tea Party. He was upset by the actions of the colonists but understood why
they were forced to act. The colonists were only trying to protect their rights as British
citizens. However, in the end Parliament passed the Coercive Acts. The mood of
Parliament and the ministry was clear as the coercive measures were passed 182 to 49
despite Chatham’s objections to them.110 Chatham’s influence continued to decline.
As Chatham predicted, the Coercive Acts only pushed the colonies further away
from the mother country. Chatham returned to Parliament in January of 1775 and
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advocated for the recalling of British troops from Boston. He believed this was necessary
if there was any hope at restoring peace between the colonies and Britain. He believed
that the presence of troops in Boston only “irritates and vexes the colonists.” In addition
to removing the troops, he stated that the coercive measures passed by Parliament a year
earlier had to be repealed.111 However, in the end, he was in the minority. He could
barely rally support for his motion, and it lost sixty-eight votes to eighteen.
In spite of his calls for moderation, Chatham had yet to pose any concrete
suggestions to alleviate the unfolding crisis. This changed in March, however, when he
proposed legislation in the House of Lords to be called the Provisional Act. 112 He
described the purpose of his plan was for the “prevention of continued ruinous mischief,”
between Britain and her colonies.113 Once again, his proposal stressed the support of laws
of navigation and trade for regulating commerce, not taxes for the purpose of collecting
revenue.114 No revenue measures would be placed on the colonies without their approval,
he argued, and he urged the utilization of the American Congress in Philadelphia. This
was a new development in that a major British statesman was giving tacit recognition to
the Congress’ legitimacy: “…it shall and may be lawful for Delegates from the respected
provinces… to meet in General Congress at Philadelphia.”115 He also he wished to see
Parliament and Congress work together for the purpose of the Empire. He implored the
Continental Congress to develop means to contribute to the ‘defense, extension, and
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prosperity’ of the British America.116 Instead of Parliament enacting measures for raising
revenue to provide for the defense and administration of the colonies, he hoped the
American Congress could develop methods of raising revenue. Therefore, Parliament
would not be paying for the colonies and would not need to raise revenue for their
protection and administration.
Chatham was urging the British to grant American colonists the same rights as
British citizens. At the same time he recognized the right and the need of the British to
regulate commerce to secure the prosperity of the Empire. He did not agree with the
colonists that British troops should not be on colonial soil without the consent of the
colonial governments. Despite calling for removal of British troops from Boston, he
believed Parliament had the authority to use troops for the purpose of security and
protection of the Empire.117 It was one thing for the British troops to be in the colonies
for the security and protection of the colonists and quite another for the purpose of
controlling and intimidating British colonists.
Chatham agreed with the colonies on the issues of the unjust use of vice admiralty
courts and the absence of the right to trial by jury. He also urged Parliament to repeal the
Coercive Acts of 1774 and instead enact his Provisional Act.118 He did not see how either
side would benefit from the enforcement of these acts, stating that they were “grievous
acts.”119 Before the House of Lords, he advised them: “to adopt a more gentle mode of
governing America.”120 He disagreed with the actions of the people of Boston, believing
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that they should pay restitution for the damaged tea. However, he was opposed to the
severity of the Coercive Acts.121 He specifically argued against the first Coercive Act:
“By blocking up the harbor of Boston, you have involved the innocent trader in the same
punishment with the guilty profligates who destroyed your merchandise”122 Chatham’s
Provisional Act stayed true to his previous stances on the relationship between Britain
and her colonies. He continued to believe “that this country had no right under heaven to
tax America.”123 Nonetheless, he once again failed to understand the true sense of the
crisis between mother country and colonies.
The Provisional Act gained one important ally in America in the person of
Chatham’s old friend, Benjamin Franklin. There were some aspects of the act that
Franklin agreed with, including the support of the repeal of the Coercive Acts and the
idea of recognizing the legitimacy of the Continental Congress and colonial
grievances.124 However, many of Franklin’s colleagues in the Continental Congress had
moved on from efforts to compromise with the British.125 Most importantly, leaders in
Britain were not accepting of Chatham’s proposals and the Provisional Act was met with
strong opposition. Leaders in London were hardening in their views on the American
colonies. There was a growing movement of returning to taxation and the possibility of
using force to make the colonies recognize the supremacy of Parliament and the King.126
The Earl of Sandwich, a statesman who had previously held the positions of
Secretary of State and ambassador to the Netherlands, spoke out against the Provincial
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Act, as a concession by Parliament to America. He stated that Parliament could not repeal
the Coercive Acts, and that to enact the Provincial Act was, “…to concede was at once to
give up the point” He believed that “America had already formed the most traitorous and
hostile intensions,” and that Britain needed to stand strong against the rebellious
colonists.127 Even some who used to agree with Chatham could not agree with his
Provincial Act. Lord Lyttleton stated, “His (Chatham) knowledge was as extensive as his
intentions were good and great; he could not probably agree with the noble earl in many
of his ideas.”128 Chatham was in the minority and his proposed Provisional Act was too
little, too late. By this point war between Britain and her colonies was unavoidable.129
In the wake of his defeat over the Provisional Act, Chatham once again fell ill. As
the crisis in American grew into outright rebellion and war, he was forced to the side
lines and played little active role in politics until the end of his life. In America, blood
had already been shed in 1775 at Lexington and Concord; and King George III had
declared the colonies in a state of open rebellion against their mother country. He
instructed the military to bring the traitorous colonists to justice.130 The North ministry
moved forward with the war as directed by the King, and the opposition was weakened
with the deaths of Grenville and Bedford and Chatham’s incapacitation.131 There were
constant changes to the King’s ministry every few years. The King’s ministries began
with Newcastle upon his accession to the throne but quickly moved on to his confidante
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Lord Bute, then to Grenville, followed briefly by Rockingham, Chatham, Grafton and
finally North in 1770. As a result, there was no consistent approach to creating an
imperial policy. The failure to achieve one would cause Britain to lose her valuable
American colonies. Chatham had the opportunity to finally create a plan for the Empire
he worked to create, but his blind spot regarding the financial ramifications of the war,
prevented him from having the chance to understand and develop a logical and realistic
imperial plan.
He was not yet permanently silenced, however. After a two year absence from
Parliament, he returned on May 30, 1777. Wrapped in flannels and using crutches, he
entered the House of Lords. Chatham still felt strongly that Britain needed to retain her
colonies in spite of the fact that they already been at war for almost two years. He opened
his speech by stressing the importance of America to Britain and reminded the peers that
it was the colonies who helped Britain win the wars of the eighteenth century: “I state to
you the importance of America; it is double the market; double the market of
consumption, and the market of supply.”132 He argued against continued warfare between
England and her colonies: “…most humbly to advise his Majesty to take the most speedy
and effectual measures for putting a stop to such fatal hostilities.” He urged “…the
commencement of a treaty to restore peace and liberty to America, strength and
happiness to England, security and permanent prosperity to both countries.”133 Not only
did he wish to retain his beloved American colonies, he also believed it would be
impossible to conquer the colonies. He also told members of Parliament to “look at a map
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of America,” believing it was impossible to conquer the American colonies as he hoped
for a quick and peaceful resolution.134
The man who had once orchestrated the ouster of France from North America
now saw all too clearly that the military realities favored the Americans. He also believed
that a relationship could be salvaged. He told Parliament that all legislation since 1763
must be repealed. In order to fund the administration and protection of the colonies, he
again proposed that colonial assemblies enact taxes to pay for themselves.135 Finally he
urged reparations for the colonies to compensate them for wartime seizures and damages.
The result underlined how far his political stock had fallen as the proposal was defeated
by ninety-nine votes to twenty-eight.
Chatham would speak in the House of Lords just twice more before his death. To
the end, his pronouncements would reveal the inconsistencies in his perceptions of the
Empire, and in particular, of the erstwhile American colonies. In November 1777, he
argued for a cessation of hostilities with America. He condemned the war calling it
“…this ruinous and ignominious situation.”136 He urged Parliament to re-establish a
peaceful relationship rooted in trade by recalling the fruitful economic tie that had
benefited the Empire, stating, “She was, indeed, the fountain of our wealth, the nerve of
our strength, the nursery and basis of our naval power.”137
He could not abide the idea of outright American independence, however. When
the Duke of Richmond proposed accepting this eventually as a precursor to peace in the
spring of 1778, Chatham returned to speak in the House of Lords on 7 April. To those
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around him, Chatham looked like the shadow of the man he once was, but he told his
fellow members of Parliament that he was forced to come and speak as he believed
granting the colonies their independence was wrong and would be the ruin of his great
country.138 However, before he could continue, he collapsed. Chatham was removed to
the anti-chamber where he was revived and transported to a nearby friend’s home on
Downing Street. Two days later, he was moved to his country estate where he was
surrounded by his family.139 Chatham would die a month later. He would die not
knowing that the American colonies he worked so hard for would eventually defeat the
British and become their own independent nation; perhaps it was better that way. In his
lifetime he helped to create one of the largest and most powerful empires. He had not,
however, enjoyed either the recipe, or the health, to play a similarly decisive role in
keeping that empire together.
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Conclusion
It has been said that George Washington was the indispensable man of the
American Revolution.1 The same could be said of William Pitt during the Seven Years’
War. As this thesis has shown, at the start of that conflict, Great Britain was faltering in
all the major theatres. However, this provided an opening for Pitt’s emergence as a key
minister and wartime leader. When he became Secretary of State in 1757, and gained
control over the prosecution of the war, the tide began to turn for Britain’s forces.
He strengthened home defenses, minimized Britain’s land-based commitments on
the European continent, approved key operations in the Mediterranean and India, and
most importantly, made the ejection of France from its North American holdings his
major wartime objective. In the process, the British army in North America was
reinforced. Hesitant or incompetent generals were replaced by younger and bolder
commanders, and ambitious combined operations involving both the army and navy
delivered decisive results. In the end, his policies and approach to war on a global scale
had redefined the British Empire.
In this thesis, major aspects of Pitt’s career have been broken down into two
periods. The first focused on his wartime service and the resulting expansion of the
empire, while the second addressed the growing post-war tensions between Britain and
its American colonies. This was a situation that grew, in no small measure, from the
financial burdens that had developed during the successful prosecution of the late war.2
It has been asserted here that Pitt proved himself to be a great wartime minister.
First and foremost, he recognized the importance of the North American theatre of the
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war. He demanded a military emphasis in the New World rather than the traditional
battlefields of Europe. He remained steadfast in his support for the efforts of the British
military in North America when it was unpopular among many of his colleagues, and
even the King himself. It was in North America that the strategies employed by Pitt met
with their greatest successes. The pivotal year was 1759, when Britain’s efforts were
rewarded with immensely important victories, as outlined in Chapter Two. Pitt did not
alter his strategy after this victorious year. He maintained the imperative of completely
destroying the French in the New World and as a result, British victories continued. The
war finally concluded with the Treaty of Paris in 1763.
Britain now boasted the largest, and potentially the most lucrative, empire in the
world. Neither Queen Elizabeth, nor Oliver Cromwell, to cite just two historical figures
that had led overseas expansions, would have comprehended such influence.3 Not even
the Roman Empire had been as large or as powerful as the empire Pitt helped to create.
As Marie Peters has suggested: “Pitt’s war leadership reaped decisive colonial success.”4
His legacy as a wartime leader who gained military victories is therefore beyond
question. This thesis has argued, however, that this is only part of Pitt’s legacy.
Decisions made in the context of the war ultimately proved to have more challenging
connotations, once peace arrived.
While leading Britain to a series of global victories in the Seven Years’ War,
Pitt’s strategy simultaneously drove the Empire into an unprecedented level of debt. He
lacked the foresight for managing the financial costs that underwrote his aggressive
strategy in North America. We have seen that Pitt believed any consideration of cost
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should be deferred until victory was achieved. But, with the war’s end, new sources of
revenue were needed to address a massive national debt, to say nothing of the rising costs
of administering and defending a global empire. This in turn required that policies must
change to meet the new realities. As we have also seen, neither imperial officials, nor the
colonists in America were fully prepared to comprehend drastic changes.
Pitt, or the Earl of Chatham as he became after 1761, was similarly baffled by
post-war realities. Although he demonstrated his great capabilities as a wartime minister,
he failed to find success as a peacetime leader. Now, changing political circumstances, a
misreading of American aspirations, philosophical stubbornness, and above all, declining
health, meant that the great war leader would be a bit player in peacetime government.
Perhaps if Chatham had been in good physical and mental health, he might have
been able to successfully contribute to an imperial policy designed to meet the changed
circumstances. However, this seems unlikely. Chatham did not formulate a plan that
brought a new vision to Britain’s relations with the American colonies. He had the vision
to win a large and powerful empire through war, but this did not extend to any new sense
of how post-war relations between the mother country and the colonies should work.
This was especially true where imperial finances were concerned. Chatham could not
reconcile the fact that he believed in the supremacy of Parliament but at the same time
denied Parliament the authority to tax the colonists as British citizens. The Empire was
in desperate need of funds, but he vehemently denied the right of Parliament to directly
tax the colonies. His support of colonial rejection of the Stamp Act, for example, fueled
the fire of rebellion in the colonies against British authority.
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Chatham’s vision of the colonies was outdated. His views were deeply rooted in
the old colonial system that prioritized trade and associated excises within a mercantilist
model driven from London. Above all, he gloried in imperial unity. The colonies, by
contrast, exhibited great confidence, self-sufficiency, and a desire for self-determination
after the Treaty of Paris.5 A return to status quo ante bellum was impossible, but he still
believed a return to the mercantile system of the Navigation Acts and Acts of Trade,
could deliver the revenues the post-war empire required. Instead, Britain would be forced
to reevaluate its colonial policy. Chatham was unprepared for this.
Over time, the crisis between the colonies and the mother country intensified as
illustrated in Chapters Three and Four. Chatham could not understand the magnitude of
the rift between Britain and her colonies, and he constantly advocated for conciliation.
His only goal was to keep the colonies an integral part of the British Empire, thereby
ignoring the financial costs that had arisen from the late war. Conciliation was not a
long-term solution, however. Financial and constitutional issues would not be solved by
the policy of conciliation. The colonists were not willing to pay taxes levied by a
government that they believed did not represent them. The relationship was on its way to
being irreparably damaged.
In the end, it is the contention of this thesis that there were two William Pitts that
must be decoupled from each other, where the backdrop to American Independence is
concerned. Pitt the war leader saved the American colonies from the French threat in
North America, but he had done so at great financial cost. Pitt/Chatham, the peacetime
politician, could hardly gainsay the financial expedients that had made victory possible,
yet he could not reconcile this with the need to gain greater colonial contributions to
5
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imperial expenses. Furthermore, he was so muddled in his views toward the imperial
parliament that he could argue for its supremacy on the one hand, while metaphorically
trying to tie its hands vis-à-vis the colonies on the other. Many years later, Thomas
Babington Macaulay would capture some sense of this tension surrounding him, when he
wrote:
Chatham at the time of his decease, had not, in both Houses of Parliament,
ten personal adherents. Half the public men of the age had been estranged
from him by his errors, and the other half by the exertions he had made to
repair his errors. His last speech had been an attack at once on the policy
pursued by the Government, and on the policy recommended by the
Opposition. But death restored him to his old place in the affection of his
country. Who could hear unmoved of the fall of that which had been so
great, and which had stood so long? The circumstances, too, seemed
rather to belong to the tragic stage than to real life.6

As this thesis has argued, his wartime legacy, that burst forth again in national mourning
at his death, has obscured focus on his postwar career, particularly where America is
concerned. Chatham could not fathom the Empire losing the American colonies that he
had fought to secure, and he literally fought for imperial unity until his last breath. The
tragedy for him was that he failed to perceive that the breach was complete, and that he
could offer nothing to repair it.

6

Thomas Babington Macaulay, ‘The Earl of Chatham’ in, A.J. Grieve, ed., Macaulay’s Critical and Historical
Essays (2 vols.), London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1907, II, 477. I am grateful to Dr. Andrew Nicholls for this
quotation.

126

Bibliography

Abu-Shumays, Mary. Review of The Elder Pitt: Earl of Chatham, by Stanley Ayling. The
Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, Vol 61, Number 3, July 3, 1978.
Almon, John. Anecdotes on the Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. London:
Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme, Patemoster-Row, 1810.
Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of the Empire in
British North America, 1754-1766. New York: Vintage Books, 2000. 5.
Andrews, Charles M. The Colonial Background of the American Revolution. New
Haven: University Press, 1975. (1)
Andrews, Charles M. The Colonial Period of American History: England’s Commercial
and Colonial Policy: Volume 4. New Haven: Yale University Press: 1938. (2)
Barack, Oscar Theodore and Lefler, Hugh Talmage. Colonial America: 2nd Edition. New
York: MacMillan Company, 1968.
Bateson, Mary, ed. A Narrative of the Changes to the Ministry 1765-1768: Told by the
Duke of Newcastle in a series of letters to John White, M.P. London: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1898.
Baugh, Daniel. The Global Seven Years’ War 1754-1763. New York: Routledge, 2011.
Black, Jeremy. Pitt the Elder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
“Boston Non-Importation Agreement, August 1, 1768.” The Avalon Project, Yale Law
School,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/boston_non_importation_1768.asp
Botti, Timothy. The Envy of the World: A History of the U.S. Economy and Big
Business. New York: Algora Publishing, 2006.
Brumwell, Stephen. Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Bradshaw, John, ed. The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield.
London: Swan Sonnenschein & Company, 1905.
Brauer, Jurgen and Tuyll, Hubert van. Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics
Explain Military History. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.

127

Brock, R.A. ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Volume I. Richmond:
Virginia Historical Society, 1883.
Brown, Peter Douglas. William Pitt Earl of Chatham, the Great Commoner. London
Allen & Unwin, 1978.
Burke, Edmund, “Speech on Conciliation with the American Colonies.” The Founders
Constitution, University of Chicago,
http://press.pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s2.html
Bushman, Richard L. Review of the Economy of British America, 1607-1789 by John
McCusker & Russell R. Menard. Technology and Culture, Vol 28, Number 2,
April 1987, pages 357-369.
Calhoon, Robert M. Revolutionary America: An Interpretative Overview. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
Chidsey, Donald Barr. The Great Separation: The Story of the Boston Tea Party and the
Beginning of the American Revolution. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1965.
Christie, Ian. “The Earl of Chatham and American Taxation, 1774-75.” The Eighteenth
Century Vol 20, Number 3, Autumn 1979, pages 246-259.
Churchill, Winston S. A History of the English Speaking Peoples: Volume 3: The Age of
Revolution. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1957.
Clarke, Dora Mae. British Opinion and the American Revolution New York: Russell
& Russell, 1966.
Cobbett, William, ed. The Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman
Conquest, in 1066 to the Year of 1803: Volume 15. London: Bagshaw, 1813.
Cobbett, William, ed. The Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman
Conquest, in 1066 to the Year of 1803: Volume 16. London: Bagshaw, 1813.
Cobbett, William, ed. The Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman
Conquest, in 1066 to the Year of 1803: Volume 18. London: Bagshaw, 1813.
Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford. England and the Seven Years’ War: A Study of Combined
Strategy, Volume I. Indian University: Longmans and Green, 1907.
Derry, John. English Politics and the American Revolution. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1976.

128

Dickenson, John. “Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the inhabitants of the
British colonies” Massachusetts Historical Society, The Coming of the Revolution
1764-1776, http://www.masshist.org/revolution/image-viewer.php?item_id=707&
img_step=1&tpc=&pid=2&mode=transcripts&tpc=pid=2#page1
Dickerson, Oliver M. American Colonial Government 1696-1765. New York: Russell &
Russell Inc., 1962.
Dickerson, Oliver M. The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951.
Donoughue, Bernard. British Politics and the American Revolution, Path to War 17731775. London: MacMillan and Company Ltd, 1964.
Extracts from the votes and proceedings of the American Continental Congress: Held at
Philadelphia on the 5th of September 1774. Massachusetts Historical Society, the
Coming of the Revolution 1764-1776, http://www.masshist.org/revolution/imageviewer.php?item_id=666&img_step=1&tpc=&pid=2&mode=transcript&tpc=&pi
d=2#page1
Flexner, James Thomas. George Washington: The Indispensible Man. Newtown, CT:
Amer Political Biography Press, 2003.
Furneaux, Rupert. Seven Years’ War 1756-1763. London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, Ltd,
1973.
Goodrich, Chauncey Allen. Embracing the Best Speeches Entire, of the Most Eminent
Orators of Great Britain for the Last Two Centuries; with Sketches of Their Lives.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1852.
Green, Walford Davis. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham and the Growth and Division of the
British Empire, 1708-1778. New York: Putnam, 1900.
Greene, Jack P. Great Britain and the American Colonies, 1606-1763. New York: Harper
and Row Publishers, 1970.
Greene, Jack P., ed. The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution 1763-1789. New
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968.
Grenville, George. “Parliament’s Right to Tax the Colonies, January 14, 1766.”
University of Maryland, Baltimore County,
http://www.umbc.edu/che/tahlessons/pdf/Was_the_Stamp_Act_Fair_RS_04.pdf
Hackman, W. Kent. “William Pitt and the Generals: Three Case Studies in the Seven
Years’ War” Albion: A Quarterly Jounral Concerned with British History, Vol 3,
Number 3. Autumn, 1971: pages 128-137.

129

Johnson, K. Capper. Aspects of Anglo-American Relations: The Historical Significance
of American Revolution in the Development of the British Commonwealth of
Nations. Oxford: Queen’s College, 1928.
Kimball, Gertrude Selwyn, ed. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. Correspondences of
William Pitt 1708-1778. Volume 1. New York: MacMillan Company, 1906.
Kimball, Gertrude Selwyn, ed. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. Correspondences of
William Pitt 1708-1778. Volume 2. New York: MacMillan Company, 1906.
King George III, “A Proclamation by The King, for Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition,
August 23, 1775.” America’s Homepage: Historic Documents of the United
States, http://ahp.gatech.edu/proclamation_bp_1775.html.
Lee, Sidney, ed. Dictionary of National Biography. London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1899.
Lovatt, Chuck. “The Seven Years’s War, and the Ascension of Pitt the Elder.” English
History Authors, Accessed October 10, 2014,
http://englishhistoryauthors.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-seven-years-war-andascension-of.html
Macaulay, Thomas Babington ‘The Earl of Chatham’ in, A.J. Grieve, ed., Macaulay’s
Critical and Historical Essays (2 vols.), London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1907.
Marston, Daniel. Seven Years’ War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.
“Massachusetts Circular Letter” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18_century/mass_circ_let_1768.asp
“Massachusetts Government Act” US History.Org,
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/mga.htm
Middleton, Richard. The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct
of the Seven Years’ War 1757-1762. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985.
“New York City, Tradesmen’s Revolves, 5 September 1768.” The National Humanities
Center 2010/2013, America in Class,
http://americainclass.org/sources/makingrevolution/crisis/text4/townshendactsres
ponse1767.pdf
Otis, James. “The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved, 1764,” US
History.Org, http://www.ushistory.org/us/9b.asp
“Patrick Henry’s Resolutions against the Stamp Act, May 29-30, 1765.” Red Hill, The
Patrick Henry National Memorial, http://www.redhill.org/speeches/stampact.htm

130

Pearson, Michael. Those Damned Rebels: The American Revolution As Seen Through
British Eyes. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2000.
Peters, Marie. Pitt and Popularity: The Patriot Minister and London Opinion during the
Seven Years’ War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Pitt, William, “Earl of Chatham’s Speech to Parliament, June 17, 1774.” The American
Revolution, 1763-1783, The Library of Congress,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presen
tations/timeline/amrev/rebelln/earl.html.
Pitt, William, “Earl of Chatham’s Speech to Parliament, May 27, 1774.” The Speeches of
Lord Chatham, Classic Persuasion,
http://www.classicpersuasion.org/cbo.chatham/chat12.htm
Pitt, William, “On the Bill of Authorizing the Quartering of British Soldiers on the
Inhabitants of Boston.” The Speeches of Lord Chatham, Classic Persuasion,
http://www.classicpersuasion.org/cbo.chatham/chat13.htm
Pitt, William, “On a motion for an address to the Crown, To Put a Stop to Hostilities in
America.” The Speeches of Lord Chatham, Classic Persuasion,
http://www.classicpersuasion.org/cbo/chatham/chat14.htm
Pitt, William, “On a motion for an address to the Throne, at the Opening of Parliament.”
The Speeches of Lord Chatham, Classic Persuasion,
http://www.classicpersuasion.org/cbo/chatham/chat15.htm
Pitt, William. Plan Offered by the Earl of Chatham, To the House of Lords, Entitled, A
Provisional Act. London: J. Almon, 1775.
Pitt, William, “The Last Speech of Lord Chatham.” The Speeches of Lord Chatham,
Classic Persuasion, http://www.classicpersuasion.org/cbo/chatham/chat17.htm
Pitt, William. “William Pitt’s Defense of the American Colonies.” Experience the Life of
Politics, Colonial Williamsburg,
http://www.history.org/Almanack/life/politics/pitt.cfm.
Pownall, Thomas. The Administration of the Colonies 1768. New York: John Carter
Brown Library, 1993.
Rabushka, Alvin. Taxation in Colonial America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2008.

131

“Resolutions and Boycotts against the Stamp Act.” The National Humanities Center
2010/2013, America in Class,
https://americainclass.org/sources.makingrevolution.crisis/text3/stampactresponse
1765. pdf
Ritcheson, Charles R. “The Elder Pitt and the American Department.” The American
Historical Review Vol 57, No 2, January 1952, pages 276-383.
Ruville, Albert von. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. New York: Putnam, 1907.
Schweizer, Karl W. “Review of Pitt the Elder by Jeremy Black.” Albion: A Quarterly
Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol 25, No 4, Winter 1993, pages 709712.
Schweizer, Karl W. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham 1708-1778: A Biography. Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993.
Simmons, Richard. The American Colonies: From Settlement to Independence. New
York: W W Norton and Company, 1981.
Simms, Brendan and Riotte, Torsten. The Hanoverian Dimension in British History
1714-1837. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Sparks, Jared, ed. The Writings of George Washington, Volume II. Boston: Charles
Tappan, 1965.
Squire, Marjorie J. British Views of the American Revolution. Boston: D.C. Heath &
Company, 1965.
Stewart, Irene, ed. Letters of General Forbes: Relating to the Expedition against Fort
Duquesne in 1758. University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2006.
Szabo, Franz A.J. The Seven Years’ War in Europe, 1756-1763. New York:
Pearson/Longman, 2008.
Taylor, William Stanhope and Pringle, John Henry, ed. Correspondences of William Pitt,
Earl of Chatham. London: Spottiswoode, 1938.
Thackeray, Frances. A History of the Right & Honourable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham:
Containing his speeches in Parliament; a considerable portion of his
correspondences, when secretary of state upon French, Spanish, and American
affairs. London: C and J Rivington, 1827.
“The Albany Plan of Union.” The Founders Constitution, University of Chicago,
http://press-pubs-uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch7s1.html

132

“The Declaratory Act, March 18 1766.” US History.org,
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/declaratory.htm
“The Stamp Act.” America’s Homepage: Historic Documents of the
United States, accessed October 14, 2014
http://ahp.gatech.edu/stamp_act_bp_1765.html
“The Treaty of Paris 1763.” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris1763.asp.
VerSteeg, Clarence L. The Formative Years 1607-1763. New York: Hill and Wang,
1964.
Washington, George. “Braddock’s Defeat.” The National Center, Historical Documents,
http://www.nationalcenter.org/Braddock%27sDefeat.html
Willcox, William B. and Arnstein, Walter L. The Age of Aristocracy 1688 to 1830.
Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1966.
Williams, Basil. The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. New York: Longmans Green,
1914.

133

